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Traditional electric power grids are currently undergoing fundamental changes: Repre-
sentative examples are the increase in the penetration of volatile and decentralized
renewable-energy sources and the emerging distributed energy-storage systems. These
changes are not viable without the introduction of automation in grid monitoring and
control, which implies the application of information and communication technolo-
gies (ICT) in power systems. Consequently, there is a transition toward smart grids.
IEEE deﬁnes smart grid as follows [1]: "The integration of power, communications,
and information technologies for an improved electric power infrastructure serving
loads while providing for an ongoing evolution of end-use applications" .
The indispensable components of the future smart grids are the communication
networks. Many well-established techniques and best practices, applied in other
domains, are revisited and applied in new ways. Nevertheless, some gaps still need to
be bridged due to the speciﬁc requirements of the smart-grid communication networks.
Concretely, a challenging objective is to fulﬁll reliability and low-delay requirements
over the wide-area networks, commonly used in smart grids.
The main “playground" for the work presented in this thesis is the smart-grid
pilot of the EPFL campus. It is deployed on the operational 20kV medium-voltage
distribution network of the campus. At the time of the writing of this thesis, the real-
time monitoring of this active distribution network has been already put in place,
as the ﬁrst step toward the introduction of control and protection. The monitoring
infrastructure relies on a communication network that is a representative example of
the smart-grid communication networks.
Keeping all this in mind, in this thesis, the main topic that we focus on, is the
assurance of data communication over redundant network-infrastructure in industrial
environments.
This thesis consists of two parts that correspond to the two aspects of the topic
that we address. In the ﬁrst part of the thesis, we evaluate existing, well-established,
technologies and solutions in the context of the EPFL smart-grid pilot. We report
on the architecture of the communication network that we built on our campus. In
addition, we go into more detail by reporting on some of the characteristics of the
devices used in the network. We also discuss security aspects of the MPLS Transport




In the second part of this thesis, we propose new solutions. While designing our
campus smart-grid network, we analyzed the imposed requirements and recognized
the need for a solution for reliable packet delivery within stringent delay constraints
over a redundant network-infrastructure. The existing solutions for exploiting network
redundancy, such as the parallel redundancy protocol (PRP), are not viable for IP-layer
wide-area networks, a key element of emerging smart grids. Other solutions (MPLS-TP
for example) do not meet the stringent delay requirement. To address this issue, we
present a transport-layer solution: the IP-layer parallel redundancy protocol (iPRP).
In the rest of the thesis, we analyze the methods for implementing fail-independent
paths that are fundamental for the optimal operation of iPRP, in SDN-based networks.
We also evaluate the beneﬁts of iPRP in wireless environments. We show that, with a
help of iPRP, the performance of the communication based on the Wi-Fi technology
can be signiﬁcantly improved.
Key words: communication networks, smart grid, redundancy, reliability, avail-
ability, mission-critical applications, industrial communications, low-latency, parallel
redundancy protocol, packet replication, real-time communication, multicast, EPFL
smart-grid testbed, software-deﬁned networking, disjoint paths, disjoint trees, fail-
independent paths, fail-independent trees, MPLS-TP, smart-grid security, security
vulnerabilities, authentication, SHDLS, trafﬁc engineering, trafﬁc shaping, packet
losses, wireless communications, Wi-Fi, measurements, performance evaluation.
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Résumé
Les réseaux électriques traditionnels subissent actuellement des changements fon-
damentaux : des exemples représentatifs sont l’augmentation de la pénétration des
sources d’énergies renouvelables (décentralisées et volatiles) et les systèmes distribués
de stockage d’énergie. Ces changements ne sont pas viables sans l’introduction de
l’automatisation dans la surveillance et le contrôle du réseau, ce qui implique l’ap-
plication des technologies de l’information et de la communication (ICT) dans les
systèmes électriques. Par conséquent, une transition vers les “smart grids" (réseau de
distribution d’électricité “intelligent") est présente.
Les réseaux de communication sont des composants indispensables des futurs
smart grids. La plupart des techniques qui sont déjà connues dans d’autres domaines
s’appliquent ici, parfois de manière innovante. Néanmoins, certaines lacunes appa-
raissent en raison des exigences spéciﬁques des réseaux de communication des smart
grids. Concrètement, un objectif ambitieux est de satisfaire aux exigences de ﬁabilité
et de délais de transmission très courts sur les réseaux étendus (wide-area networks -
WANs), couramment utilisés dans les smart grids.
Le principal banc de test pour le travail présenté dans cette thèse est le test expéri-
mental d’un smart grid sur le campus de l’EPFL. Il est déployé sur le réseau électrique
opérationnel du campus. Au moment de l’écriture de cette thèse, le suivi en temps
réel de ce réseau de distribution actif a été déjà mis en place. C’est la première étape
vers l’introduction du contrôle et de la protection. L’infrastructure de surveillance est
basée sur un réseau de communication qui est un exemple représentatif des réseaux
de communication de smart grids. En gardant tout cela à l’esprit, dans cette thèse,
notre thème principal est le support de transmission de données sur une infrastructure
de réseau redondant dans des environnements industriels.
Dans la première partie de la thèse, nous évaluons, les technologies et les solutions
existantes dans le contexte du smart grid de l’EPFL. Nous décrivons l’architecture du
réseau de communication que nous avons construit sur notre campus. En outre, nous
montrons certaines des caractéristiques des dispositifs utilisés dans le réseau. Nous
discutons également des aspects de sécurité de MPLS-TP (MPLS Transport Proﬁle),
qui est une des technologies proposées dans le cadre de smart grids.
Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous proposons de nouvelles solutions.
Pendant la conception de notre réseau de communication, nous avons analysé les
exigences qui sont imposées et nous avons reconnu la nécessité d’une solution pour
v
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la transmission de paquets ﬁable et avec des contraintes strictes de délai sur une
infrastructure réseau redondante. Les solutions existantes pour exploiter la redondance
du réseau, tels que le protocole de redondance parallèle (parallel redundancy protocol
- PRP), ne sont pas viables pour des réseaux étendus basés sur IP, un élément clé de
l’émergence des réseaux intelligents. Les autres solutions (MPLS-TP, par exemple) ne
répondent pas à l’exigence de délai strict. Pour résoudre ce problème, nous présentons
une solution dans la couche transport : IP-layer parallel redundancy protocol (iPRP).
Dans le reste de la thèse, nous analysons les méthodes pour fournir des chemins de
communication redondants qui sont fondamentales pour le fonctionnement optimal
d’iPRP, dans les réseaux basés sur SDN. Nous évaluons également les avantages d’iPRP
pour la communication sans ﬁl. Nous montrons qu’iPRP améliore considérablement
la performance de Wi-Fi.
Mots clefs : réseaux de communication, smart grid, redondance, ﬁabilité, disponi-
bilité, communication industrielle, faible délai, parallel redundancy protocol, réplica-
tion de paquets, communication en temps réel, multicast, EPFL smart grid, Software
Deﬁned Networking, chemins de communication redondants, arbres indépendants,
MPLS-TP, sécurité de smart grid, failles de sécurité, authentiﬁcation, SHDSL, mise en




ADN Active distribution network
BFD Bidirectional forwarding detection
CDF Cumulative distribution function
CPU Central processing unit
DSLAM Digital subscriber line access multiplexer
DTLS Datagram transport layer security
ECMP Equal-cost multipath routing
FIFO First in, ﬁrst out
GPS Global positioning system
ICT Information and communication technologies
IND iPRP network subcloud discriminator
IP Internet protocol
iPRP IP-layer parallel redundancy protocol
LACP Link aggregation control protocol
LAN Local-area networks
LER Label edge router
LSP Label-switched path
MAC Media access control
MPLS Multiprotocol label switching
MPLS-TP Multiprotocol label switching - transport proﬁle
MPTCP Multipath transmission control protocol
MTU Maximum transmission unit
OS Operating system
OSPF Open shortest path ﬁrst
PDC Phasor-data concentrator
PMU Phasor-measurement unit
PSC Protection state coordination
PRP parallel redundancy protocol
RFC Request for comments
RIP Routing information protocol
RSTP Rapid spanning tree protocol




SDH Synchronous digital hierarchy
SDN Software-deﬁned networking
SE State estimator
SHDSL Symmetrical high-speed digital subscriber line
SONET Synchronous optical networking
SSM Source-speciﬁc multicast
STP Spanning tree protocol
TCP Transmission control protocol
TLS Transport layer security
UDP User datagram protocol
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Lately, smart grid has become a buzzword that is heard in many different contexts. Per-
haps the deﬁnition that is the simplest, and at the same time, sufﬁciently broad, is that
smart grid is the convergence of traditional power grids, and information and commu-
nications technologies. Thus, an indispensable part of smart grids are communication
networks.
The primary objective of smart-grid communication networks is to support trafﬁc
for all applications; this includes real-time trafﬁc (e.g., for grid monitoring and control).
Packet losses or excessive packet delays due to communication-network failures can
result in economic losses or, even worse, human lives can be endangered in cases when
these failures affect protection mechanisms. Therefore, high communication-network
availability is an imperative (according to [2], even 99.999%, which translates to ﬁve
minutes of downtime per year, might not be enough).
A typical technique for increasing communication-network availability is to build a
redundant network-infrastructure (cloned networks, rings, rings of rings, etc.). How-
ever, the existence of redundant network-infrastructure alone is not enough, as it has
to be accompanied by proper mechanisms for exploiting the existing redundancy in
case of a failure and because of many other challenges. We can ﬁnd many techniques
in the literature that are successfully applied to other domains. But, due to speciﬁc
timing and reliability requirements imposed on smart-grid communication networks,
these techniques are not always suitable for achieving the desired levels of reliability.
In this thesis, we address this problem and we offer solutions for effective exploitation
of redundant network-infrastructure in the context of smart grids.
For a more general outlook, we discuss the global trends that led to the emergence
of smart grids in Section 1.1.1. In addition, the development of the smart-grid pilot at
1
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EPFL is described in Section 1.1.2. It served as a realistic base for the research that is
presented in this thesis.
1.1.1 Global Trends
For many years, the predominant sources of electric power were large power plants.
The produced power was transferred to consumers through a system of transmission
and distribution substations where the voltage levels were progressively reduced, as
it approaches the customers’ premises. The whole process was characterized by one-
way ﬂows of electricity - from the large producers toward the customers. As such,
the system was rather predictable, which is why the simple monitoring and control
systems were acceptable. Operators were able to steer the system successfully in most
cases, even if the time-granularity of the system-state updates was in the order of 15
minutes.
This well-established landscape started to change toward the end of the last century.
Driven by the negative effects of the climate change, the introduction of renewable
energy sources was inevitable. They are usually found in the form of distributed energy
resources, which led to two-way power ﬂows. In addition, the renewables can be highly
intermittent (e.g., the sudden appearance of a cloud can dramatically change the
power production of photo-voltaic panels). Hence, it is very difﬁcult to predict power
production. It became much more challenging to maintain the system stability and
to guarantee service quality (e.g., voltage levels and frequency need to be in a certain
range). Consequently, a much more sophisticated control and monitoring system
became essential, which led to the introduction of information and communication
technologies, i.e. smart grids. Furthermore, this transition has opened the doors for
demand-response mechanisms and grid modernization in general.
Needless to say, smart-grid functionalities rely upon the reliable and timely ex-
change of information between intelligent electronic devices deployed in the ﬁeld
(controllers, actuators...) Thus, a reliable communication network represents the heart
of the smart grid.
1.1.2 EPFL-Campus Smart-Grid Pilot
In order to understand the context in which we operate, we brieﬂy describe the real-
time monitoring infrastructure of the smart-grid pilot on the EPFL campus. The
smart-grid pilot is deployed on the medium-voltage electrical grid of the EPFL cam-
pus. It is considered to be a challenging active distribution network (ADN) due to its
characteristics, such as the presence of distributed power-generation (photo-voltaic




Figure 1.1: EPFL campus with locations of medium-voltage transformers that are mon-
itored. The white line represents the electrical feeder for which the state estimation is
performed. Acronyms in the Figure are the names of different buildings of the EPFL
campus.
The real-time operation of an ADN uses its knowledge of the global state of the
electrical network, which requires performing quasi-simultaneous, accurate, high-
frequency measurements of physical quantities (such as voltage and phase) in buses
of the electrical network. They are obtained by phasor measurement units (PMUs)
equipped with synchronized clocks (e.g., via GPS) that are interfaced to medium-
voltage transformers through specialized sensors. The data is then conveyed via a
communication network to a phasor-data concentrator (PDC). The PDC concentrates
the data and prepares it for processing by an electrical network state estimator (SE).
Concretely, at EPFL, one feeder is monitored; this feeder spans ﬁve sites, each of them
equipped with a PMU [3]. Figure 1.1 depicts locations of medium-voltage transformers
that are monitored. And, in Figure 1.2, we show the block diagram that describes how
the system elements are combined together.
For the moment, the output of the EPFL SE is used only for electrical-network
monitoring. Nevertheless, this information produced by the SE can be used by a
network controller for management purposes, which is expected to be implemented in
3
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Figure 1.2: System-architecture block diagram
the future. Using the estimated state of the electrical network, the network controller
should take actions that control the electrical network within a predeﬁned (safe)
range of operating set-points. Furthermore, the same information can be also used
by other smart-grid applications such as fault location in power networks or active
load-management using model predictive control strategy.
The EPFL-campus smart-grid pilot is a representative example of an active distribu-
tion network. As such, it is a perfect “playground" for the work presented in this thesis.
In addition, it gave us a unique opportunity to experience the real-life challenges of
building an ADN communication network. These challenges were invaluable in dis-
covering the problems that need to be solved, which helped us to deﬁne our research
directions.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
In the ﬁrst part of the thesis, we evaluate existing, well-established, technologies and
solutions in the context of the EPFL smart-grid pilot. Concretely, in Chapter 3, we
report on the architecture of the communication network that we built on our campus.
In addition, we go into more detail by reporting on some of the characteristics of the
devices used in the network and the effect of these characteristics on the network
operation. This work led us to conclusions about the importance of trafﬁc engineering
for the operation of critical network infrastructure.
MPLS Transport Proﬁle (MPLS-TP) is one of the proposed technologies for smart-
grid WAN connectivity. Therefore, it was a natural starting point for studying the
approaches to building communication networks in smart grids. In particular, we were
interested in the protection-switching mechanism of MPLS-TP, so we built a testbed to
investigate its performance. While studying the protocol, we discovered some security
vulnerabilities. We report on them in Chapter 4, where we show that, when it comes
to the security aspects of the standard, there is a discrepancy between RFCs and the
Cisco implementation for MPLS-TP that we evaluated, which is not surprising given
4
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the complexity of RFCs. The revealed inconsistencies also show the importance of
having a comprehensive approach to building systems, which includes security from
the very beginning.
During the design of our campus smart-grid network, we analyzed the imposed
requirements and recognized the need for a solution for reliable packet delivery within
stringent delay-constraints over a redundant network-infrastructure. One of the con-
clusions of the investigation of the protection-switching mechanism of MPLS-TP,
which is supposed to take advantage of the network redundancy, was that it does
not satisfy the stringent time requirements imposed by mission-critical applications.
The parallel-redundancy protocol (PRP) is another solution that satisﬁes the delay
requirements. PRP works best in local area networks, e.g., sub-station networks, by
replicating all packets at the MAC layer over parallel paths. It is not, however, viable for
IP-layer wide-area networks, a key element of emerging smart grids. These ﬁndings
initiated further research, and in Chapter 5 we present our solution to the problem
of ensuring effective exploitation of redundant network-infrastructure: the IP-layer
parallel redundancy protocol (iPRP).
The existence of fail-independent paths is fundamental for the optimal operation
of iPRP. It is not difﬁcult to enforce such paths in a dedicated and fully controlled
network infrastructure. But, when a shared network infrastructure is used, this task
becomes very challenging. We address this problem in Chapter 6, where we evalu-
ate different algorithms (proposed in the literature) for providing node-redundant
multicast-distribution trees. We study speciﬁcally how to adapt these algorithms in
an SDN network and compare them based on the parameters that are relevant in an
industrial environment.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we analyze the beneﬁts of iPRP in wireless environments.
Typically, wireless communication is not seen as a good candidate for low-delay com-
munication with high-reliability requirements. We show that, with a help of iPRP, the
performance of the communication based on the Wi-Fi technology can be signiﬁcantly
improved.
1.3 Contributions
The following is the list of the main contributions of this thesis.
• We built a dedicated communication network to support the needs of the EPFL-
campus smart-grid pilot. It enables researchers from the collaborating Distributed
Electrical Systems Laboratory (DESL) lab to put into practice theoretical concepts from
the ﬁeld of power systems. It enables us to gain ﬁrst-hand experience of challenges in
the processes of design and exploitation of smart-grid communication networks.
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• Through the experiments in the network that we built, we deﬁned its operating
region, which was an important step toward successful network-operation. We also
demonstrated the importance of trafﬁc engineering.
• We built a testbed to evaluate the security of MPLS-TP. This enabled us to reveal
security vulnerabilities of the MPLS-TP implementation of a major network manufac-
turer. We exploited those vulnerabilities by designing and putting into place number
of attacks that result in partial or, in some attacks, the complete network being com-
promised.
•We designed and implemented the IP-layer parallel redundancy protocol (iPRP): a
solution to the problem of effective utilization of redundant communication-networks.
The design of iPRPposes non-trivial challenges in the formof selective packet-replication,
soft-state and multicast support, which we overcame successfully. iPRP provides sup-
port for multicast, widely used in smart-grid networks. It has a characteristic of selec-
tively replicating only the trafﬁc desired by a user (e.g., time-critical UDP trafﬁc). iPRP
only requires a simple software installation on the end-devices. There are no modiﬁ-
cations needed for the existing monitoring application, for the end-device operating
system or for the intermediate network devices.
•We successfully deployed iPRP on the EPFL-campus smart-grid pilot thus demon-
strating that iPRP contributes to the reliability of the message exchange between the
hosts that are part of the EPFL-campus smart-grid pilot.
• We studied how to construct node-redundant multicast trees that could be used
in parallel over a shared network infrastructure in the context of smart grids, and that
are necessary for the optimal operation of iPRP. We evaluated different algorithms
proposed in the literature for providing such trees. We studied speciﬁcally how to adapt
these algorithms in an SDN network and compare them based on (1) the number of
forwarding rules that need to be installed on SDN switches, (2) the number of hops
between source-destination pairs given the installed forwarding rules, and (3) the
number of sources that can be placed in the network given the capacity constraints.
In addition, we discussed the effects of topology changes (node failures, new source
arrival and new destination arrival) on the activity of the SDN control plane.
• Finally, we demonstrated the beneﬁts of iPRP in a wireless environment. We built
a roof-top testbed and conduct experiments where we show that iPRP reduces the
number of packet losses perceived by an application that runs on top of iPRP. Hence,
iPRP can contribute in building cost-effective communication networks based on
wireless technologies.
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Webegin this chapterwith an overviewof themechanisms for exploiting communication-
network redundancy (Section 2.1). Later on, we focus on the smart-grid case where link
or device failures are among the possible reasons for packet-delivery failures. These
failures can be overcome by building redundant network-infrastructure. Therefore,
we give particular attention to the mechanisms for exploiting network redundancy
that are proposed in the context of smart grids (Section 2.2). Security goes hand-in-
hand with the reliability of smart-grid communication networks, so we conclude the
chapter by giving some details about the best practices in securing such networks from
cyber-attacks (Section 2.3).
2.1 Overview of Mechanisms for Exploiting Network Redun-
dancy
Typical examples of techniques for exploiting network redundancy are summarized in
Table 2.1, based on [2].
Protocol Recovery Time Applicable to IP networks?
Routing protocols (e.g. OSPF) tens of seconds YES
Ethernet link aggregation (e.g. LACP) few seconds YES
Rapid spanning tree protocol few seconds YES
SONET/SDH rings 50ms YES
MPLS-TP 50ms YES
SDN-based solutions tens of milliseconds YES
Parallel redundancy protocol (PRP) 0ms NO
Table 2.1: Techniques for exploiting network redundancy.
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We proceed by giving main characteristics of these techniques.
Routingprotocols. Based on the information exchanged andprocessed by the routers,
they deﬁne the paths taken by packets in a communication network. We distinguish
distance-vector routing protocols and link-state routing protocols. Distance-vector
routing protocols can be based on the Bellman-Ford algorithm [4], and notable ex-
amples are RIP [5], RIPv2 [6] and IGMP [7]. Link-state routing protocols are based on
creating a connectivity map of the entire network and notable examples are OSPF [8]
and IS-IS [9].
Ethernet link aggregation. The main purposes of this technique are to increase
throughput and to provide redundancy. It achieves this goals by grouping physical
ports of a bridge which are then treated together. This way, failure of a single link from
a group, once detected, does not affect connectivity. An example of such protocol is
the link aggregation control protocol (LACP) [10].
Rapid spanning tree protocol (RSTP). The main purpose of RSTP [11] is to prevent
loops in bridged networks. It achieves this by computing a tree that covers all the
bridges in the network and that disables unused links. When necessary, RSTP also
handles link or device failures by performing tree-reconﬁguration. It represents an
evolution of the older spanning tree protocol (STP) [12] and it is characterized by a
faster convergence time upon topology changes, compared to STP.
SONET/SDH rings. The synchronous optical networking (SONET) [13] and the syn-
chronous digital hierarchy (SDH) [14] are two similar technologies that are based on
the ﬁber infrastructure, in the form of a ring, that interconnects network nodes and
associated end-hosts. Communication is possible in both directions of the ring. Thus,
any single link failure (e.g., ﬁber cut), once detected, does not disconnect the network
nodes and the associated end-hosts.
MPLS-TP. The multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) [15] is a mechanism for packet
forwarding that is based on path labels instead of IP addresses that are used by routing
protocols. Each label identiﬁes one label-switched path (LSP) that is established be-
tween MPLS routers. MPLS can coexist with non-MPLS networks (e.g., IP networks)
through the concept of a label edge router (LER) that encapsulates or decapsulates IP
packets on the edges of an MPLS network. An important functionality of MPLS is the
support for trafﬁc engineering. MPLS-TP (multiprotocol label switching - transport
proﬁle) [16] represents the evolution of MPLS, with improved features concerning
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failure circumvention [17], which are important for mission-critical network infras-
tructure.
Software-deﬁned networking (SDN). It represents an emerging approach to net-
work control and management [18] and has the potential advantage of lower cost
and higher modularity and ﬂexibility, compared to traditional approaches. The main
characteristics of SDN are the control and data planes that are decoupled. The cen-
tralized controller gathers all the information about the network and communicates
the resulting forwarding rules on the SDN-switches. This concept is contrary to the
one applied in the case of routing protocols where the decisions are made in a decen-
tralized manner. OpenFlow [19] is the main representative of SDN-based solutions for
network administration.
Parallel redundancyprotocol (PRP). Theparallel redundancy protocol (PRP) [20,21]
is an IEC standard used to increase reliability. PRP can be used by devices with double
network interfaces. It takes advantage of speciﬁc network topologies, where each
device is connected through its network interfaces to fail-independent communication
networks. An essential requirement of PRP is that the two networks need to be identical
copies of each other. Hence, the two network interfaces of a same device (each of them
connected to a different network) need to have the same MAC address. PRP works as
follows: When a MAC frame is transmitted by a host, it is replicated on its two network
interfaces, after being tagged with a redundancy control trailer. The destination MAC
address is the same on both networks, as explained. The destination host receives the
frames on its two interfaces. The added trailer contains a frame sequence number
that, along with the source MAC address, enables the receiver to detect and eliminate
redundant frames. Thus, a packet loss on one of the paths is repaired in zero time.
We are mainly interested in the recovery time that is needed for a failure repair,
provided by the aforementioned techniques. This time depends on a failure-detection
mechanism which is fundamentally the same for all the protocols — except for the par-
allel redundancy protocol (PRP) — and is based on some form of keep-alive signaling.
The absence of several (usually three) consecutive keep-alive messages is recognized
as a failure, which triggers the process of activating alternative paths. The shorter the
keep-alive period is, the sooner the failure will be detected. In the same time, a shorter
keep-alive period means more trafﬁc overhead.
As mentioned before, the parallel redundancy protocol (PRP) [20] has a different
approach. Packets are sent in parallel over cloned networks, and only the one that
arrives ﬁrst at the destination is accepted, the other one is silently discarded. This way,
even if one of the cloned networks is not operational, packets are delivered over the
healthy network to the applications that expect them.
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Delay Relative priority Application
Application allowance [ms] 0 (max)-100 (min) type
Delay≤ 10ms
High-speed protection 8 2 Teleprotection
Load shedding 10 20 SCADA
10ms<Delay≤ 20ms
Breaker reclosers 16 15 Teleprotection
PMU data (for protection) 20 12 Synchrophasors
20ms<Delay≤ 100ms
PMU data 60 10 Synchrophasors
Time synchronization 100 20 Synchrophasors
100ms<Delay≤ 250ms
VoIP bearer 175 50 Business voice
Critical business data 250 70 Business data
250ms<Delay≤ 1s
Noncritical operations data 500 80 SCADA
Noncritical business data 500 80 Business data
1s<Delay
Image ﬁles 1000 90 SCADA
Best effort 2000 100 Many
Table 2.2: Sample of applications with their delay requirements and relative priorities
for smart-grid use, based on [2].
In practice, often a combination of the techniques from Table 2.1 can be used.
For example, a variant of the spanning-tree protocol and a routing protocol often go
together, even in relatively simple networks and networks without high-availability
requirements. Naturally, there is a question about whether these techniques are readily
applicable in smart grids. It is not straightforward to answer this question because
the term smart grid has different meanings to different people. For some, it is about
collecting the non-critical information from smart meters [22]. At the other extreme, it
is about using ICT infrastructure for protection in modern power grids [23]. Conse-
quently, the delay allowances for the messages of interest vary in a similar way. Table
2.2, based on [2], represents a sample of different applications and the corresponding
delay allowances and (relative) priorities. The delay allowances can be in the order
of several milliseconds up to several seconds. The approaches in coping with the
link or device failures depend on how stringent these timing requirements are. In
addition, there is a question about the size of the communication network, which
translates to whether the network can be local or not. In the next section, we discuss
the applicability of these techniques in smart grids with more protocol details where
needed.
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2.2 Dealing with Component Failures in Smart-Grid Commu-
nication Networks
Table 2.2 gives an overview of applications found in smart grids and for which com-
munication needs to be ensured. For the non-critical trafﬁc (e.g., regular software
update), a possible approach is to use TCP protocol at the transport layer, in com-
bination with some mechanisms for connectivity reestablishment (e.g., RSTP and
OSPF). This process can be lengthy, as a routing-protocol convergence-time can be
in the order of minutes. But the real challenge is meeting the timing requirements
for the applications that can be found in smart grids with very hard delay-constraints
(e.g., protection). This is why the Multiprotocol Label Switching - Transport Proﬁle
(MPLS-TP) [17, 24–27] is often referenced as one of the proposed technologies for
smart-grid IP networks [2,28,29]. In particular, its protection-switching mechanism,
with 50-ms reaction-time guarantee, is considered as the state-of-the-art approach
in reaching the goal of highly available smart-grid communication networks. This
mechanism pre-allocates alternative paths that are activated within 50-ms following a
link or device failure, thus re-establishing end-to-end connectivity.
In addition, MPLS-TP is compatible with Integrated services (IntServ) architec-
ture [30] that provides quality-of-service guarantees and is implemented through the
resource reservation protocol (RSVP) [31]. Hence, trafﬁc-priority policies, such as the
one from Table 2.2, can be enforced with a goal of timely delivery of critical messages.
Software-deﬁned networking (SDN) [18] is another proposed technology in the
context of smart grids [32–37] for meeting both delay and quality-of-service require-
ments. It represents an alternative to traditional approaches to network control and
management, such as the aforementioned MPLS-TP. Still, MPLS-TP (or some of its
features) can be a basis for an SDN solution, as there are two approaches as to how
SDN can be applied in smart-grid communication networks. In the ﬁrst one, an SDN
controller implements the full MPLS-TP speciﬁcations. To this end, there is a trend
of adding more and more MPLS functionalities to the SDN architecture. This effort is
evident from the evolution of the OpenFlow speciﬁcations [38] (OpenFlow protocol is
an enabler of SDN).
The second approach to using SDN technology is to perform a higher level of
customization and to selectively apply only the desired functionalities that may or
may not be inspired by the MPLS-TP speciﬁcations. For example, authors in [37]
demonstrate an addition of the network-protection support based on the bidirectional
forwarding detection (BFD) protocol. This protocol is also used in MPLS-TP for link-
failure detection.
PRP represents the state-of-the-art technology for exploiting network redundancy
in substation local area networks (LANs) where operators have full control over the
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design process. Therefore, dedicated and cloned networks can be built and, with the
help of PRP, 0ms-packet-repair time can be reached.
2.2.1 Inconsistencies Between Best Practices and Requirements
Reaching the goal of a reliable and secure smart-grid communication network is far
from being straightforward, despite all the above-mentioned recommendations and
our awareness of the requirements that need to be fulﬁlled when building such a
network.
Perhaps the most obvious example, of where there is a gap between the require-
ments and the proposed solutions, is about meeting the delay requirements for time-
critical smart-grid applications. Concretely, in Table 2.2, we can see that there are
quite a few applications that have a delay allowance below 50ms. Nevertheless, as
mentioned before, many industry-oriented sources refer to MPLS-TP as the technology
on which smart-grid communication networks should be based despite the (higher)
50ms-switchover time, guaranteed by the protection-switching feature of MPLS-TP.
A possible explanation for this discrepancy is in the fact that it is very tempting (and
cost-effective) for vendors and equipment manufacturers to offer technologies and
products that are conceived for applications in other ﬁelds with different require-
ments. Simply putting a smart-grid label on the existing products, however, is often
not enough.
We ﬁnd similar inconsistencies also in more academic-oriented sources. Link-
failure or node-failure detection-mechanisms, proposed in the context of SDN-based
communication networks, require time that ranges from several seconds [34, 35] to
several tens of milliseconds at best [36,37], thus also failing to meet stringent delay-
requirements for time-critical smart-grip applications. Interestingly enough, when
it comes to the failure detection in the SDN-based comunication networks, the best
results are achieved when applying the bidirectional forwarding detection (BFD) mech-
anism used in MPLS-TP [37].
The only technology that guarantees 0ms-packet-repair time is PRP. Nevertheless,
PRP is conceived to support substation automation where LANs are dominant and, as
such, is not applicable for IP networks that are a key element for smart grids. Still, PRP
serves as an inspiration for solutions presented in this thesis (see Chapter 5).
The main focus of this thesis is to bridge the identiﬁed gaps with the objective of
enabling the redundant communication-networks to meet the delay requirements for
time-critical smart-grid applications.
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2.3 Cyber-Security of Smart-Grid Communication Networks
When it comes to security, many problems that are present in other ﬁelds are appearing
in smart grids as well. Hence, ideally, best-practice techniques, which are used to
secure the ICT infrastructure in other ﬁelds, should be applied. In addition, there are
references that focus on smart-grid security; probably the most extensive reference is
the report of the US national institute of standard and technology (NIST) [39].
Nevertheless, due to some of the peculiarities of speciﬁc smart-grid systems or
applications, it is not always possible to apply directly the recommended techniques.
For example, due to stringent time requirements imposed on critical-messages delivery,
providing authentication and conﬁdentiality for such messages with the commonly-
used transport layer security (TLS) protocol can be infeasible [40]. Another potential
source of difﬁculties comes from the fact that in power systems it is not unusual to ﬁnd
installed in the ﬁeld devices with very long expected lifetimes (sometimes even tens of
years). Applying state-of-the-art security techniques to such legacy equipment can be
simply impossible due to device limitations.
This being said, before opting for certain security solution all the speciﬁcs of the
smart grid of interest need to be taken into account. Then, based on potential threats,
suitable security measures should be determined. For example, an analysis of the
potential threats to active distribution network is given in [41], where authors list
possible attacks. This list includes unauthorized access to smart-grid devices, man-
in-the-middle attacks following the intrusion in the communication channel, rogue-
device installation, denial-of-service attacks and malicious software-patching. The
authors also suggest a set of applicable security solutions and best practices.
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3 EPFL-Campus Smart-Grid Commu-
nication Network
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe the communication network built as part of the EPFL-
campus smart-grid pilot. The purpose of the pilot is the experimental validation of
the concept of real-time state estimation for an active distribution network. The main
infrastructure components are (1) phasor mesurement units (PMUs) that output phys-
ical quantities (such as voltage and phase) every 20ms, (2) a dedicated communication
network, and (3) electrical-network state estimation (SE) process for real-time monitor-
ing, which also comprises a phasor-data concentration (PDC) process. In the following,
we focus on the communication network that has been built. We give details about the
network design (Section 3.2) that resulted from the system requirements.
During the equipment installation phase, and later on, during the exploitation
of our network, we performed some experiments to deﬁne the operating region of
the infrastructure that is based on the single-pair high-speed digital subscriber line
(SHDSL) technology. We present the results of these experiments. They concern
mainly the SHDSL infrastructure. In Section 3.3 we deﬁne the operating region of the
SHDSL communication channel, and in Section 3.4 we detail experiments that reveal
some limitations of the used DSLAMs, devices that concentrate SHDSL channels. The
lessons learned from these experiments are important for the successful exploitation
of the network, as concluded in Section 3.5.
3.2 Communication Network Architecture
As the controller relies on up-to-date state estimates, the communication network
plays a crucial role in the operation of an active distribution network. It needs to ensure
the delivery of PMU data within stringent time delays and with minimal loss to the
central control point. Additionally, it needs to be immune to power cuts because, at
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such critical moments, its availability is essential. For these reasons alone, a dedicated
communication infrastructure is required (as typical communication networks are
inoperative during blackouts). A dedicated communication network is preferred; also
for security reasons.
As we built our dedicated network from scratch, we decided to use IPv6 rather
than IPv4, in order to prevent future transition issues. We avoided expensive cabling
deployments by re-using existing twisted pair cables, originally installed for telephony.
These cables are passive and are star-wired from a central point, the “PBX room” in
Figure 1.1, where the backup power is available. Communication over twisted pair
cables uses the single-pair high-speed digital subscriber line (SHDSL) technology,
as the cables that are in place are too long for Ethernet. Trafﬁc from all PMUs is
concentrated at the SHDSL concentrators (called DSLAMs) located in the PBX room.
This would also be the natural place to locate the phasor-data concentrator (PDC)
and state estimator (SE) machines; however, we had only very restricted access to it.
Hence, we had to place the PDC and SE machines in a more convenient location; for
communications from the PBX room to PDC, we had to use more expensive optical
ﬁbers at 100 Mb/s, as the bitrate of SHDSL (2 Mb/s) would not have been sufﬁcient here.
The whole network is resilient to up to 8 hours of power outage; it is trafﬁc-engineered
to ensure enough capacity for the generated trafﬁc.
The entire communication network is in fact duplicated, as seen in Figure 3.1. We
developed an IP version of the parallel redundancy protocol, called iPRP (presented in
Chapter 5); it takes care of duplicating UDP packets (at PMUs) and removing duplicates
(at the PDC). This provides 0-ms repair of packet losses. We implemented iPRP as a
transport-layer solution in the Linux operating systems of the PMUs and PDC; this
has the beneﬁt of not requiring any changes to any PMU/PDC applications or to any
network devices. Raw measurements and state estimator outputs are made public
through a web interface1. Every stored ﬁle contains one hour of data; it is a self-
explanatory text ﬁle that is digitally signed.
1http://smartgrid.epﬂ.ch
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Figure 3.1: EPFL-campus smart-grid communication network.
3.3 Deﬁning the Operating Region of the SHDSL Communica-
tion Channel
To understand the physical-layer limits of the SHDSL communication channels that are
to be deployed, we investigate the behavior of the network in situations of congestion
when the load is slightly above the capacity limit for short periods of time, because
non-determinism that characterizes software used in network components can cause
unexpected behavior. For example, packets containing measurement results could be
backlogged due to a software update or a scheduled security session key replacement.
As a result, there occurs a burst of packets that, for a short period of time, requires a
larger capacity than available (which implicitly results in packet losses). Nevertheless,
even when packet losses are inevitable, we need to ensure that they are not excessive.
In this section we show that with off-the-shelf equipment excessive packet losses are
possible in some practical scenarios. Hence, as part of the design phase we need to
specify under which conditions this can happen, i.e., we need to deﬁne the operating
region of the whole system.
Our approach was to begin by measuring the maximum throughput that can be
achieved on an SHDSL communication channel. When we conducted further tests
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they led to surprising results. We observe that when the PDC data transmission rate
slightly exceeds the capacity of the SHDSL link, even for a short period of time, goodput
drops catastrophically. Speciﬁcally, we measure a maximum achievable goodput of
1.98Mbps at the destination (the capacity of the SHDSL link). However, when the PDC
generates data at 2.2Mbps, we obtain drastically different goodput at the destination,
depending on the frame size: For a frame size of 2178, the goodput is 1.25Mbps, i.e.,
37% loss, whereas for a frame size of 1815B, the goodput is 850kbps, i.e., 57% loss.
We explain this phenomenon by the combination of two separate factors: IP frag-
mentation that splits each frame in two IP packets with very different sizes, and
FIFO/tail-drop queuing discipline within line terminal devices at the source end.
We conclude that following the guidelines from C37.118.2-2011 standard [42] is not
sufﬁcient for designing a PMU data transfer layer. This comes from the fact that the
standard deﬁnes messaging including types, use, contents and data-formats, whereas
trafﬁc management issues are out of its scope. At the end of this chapter we give some
guidelines on how the problem can be mitigated by implementing trafﬁc shaping
within PMUs.
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup is shown in Figure 3.2.
We use ZyXEL SHDSL line terminals [43] that implement G.SHDSL.bis technology
[44]. They are connected via a twisted-pair loopback circuit. The length of the twisted-
pair corresponds to the typical distance between two end-points on campus. The two
PCs run Ubuntu Linux. They are connected to SHDSL line terminals and are used
for several purposes: to emulate PDCs/PMUs, to run tools like   and  , or to
run other custom applications written in C++ designed for a speciﬁc experiment. The
connection between each PC and its line terminal is a 100Mbps Ethernet link. The line
terminal forwards the data on the twisted-pair.
The very ﬁrst experiments evaluate maximum available throughput that can be
achieved, as well as the round-trip time (RTT). To this end we used the standard  
and   tools, respectively. On average we found a maximum available throughput of
1.98 Mbps and a RTT of 3.4 ms.
3.3.2 Discovering Line-Terminal Queue Size and Queuing Discipline
Due to the lack of documentation from the manufacturer of SHDSL line terminals, we
performed experiments to discover the characteristics of the queues that are imple-
mented within a device. This was necessary in order to understand the packet-loss
patterns presented in the next subsection. The input interface capacity is roughly 50
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Figure 3.2: Experimental setup. SHDSL line terminals (black boxes in the middle) are
connected by a twisted-pair loopback circuit.
times higher than the output interface capacity. The bottleneck where packets are
dropped is a queue that corresponds to the outgoing interface of the line terminal (see
Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: FIFO/tail-drop queue within SHDSL line terminal where losses occur.
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We run a sequence of experiments to determine the queue size and the queuing
discipline. On the sender side, we send bursts of packets, and, on the receiver side,
we examine the received packets. We vary the burst size between 1 and 100 packets.
We also vary the size of the payload (50 B, 500 B, 1000 B and 1452 B). Each packet sent
contains a sequence number that is inspected at the receiving end. The results of these
experiments are depicted in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Number of lost packets for different datagram and burst sizes.
We observe that regardless of the packet size, the 52nd packet is always the ﬁrst
one to be lost. Furthermore, by analyzing the sequence numbers of the received
packets, we observe that all the following packets are also lost. We conclude that the
outgoing buffers associated with SHDSL line-terminal interfaces are implemented as
FIFO queues with tail-drop queue management algorithm, with a queue size of 50
packets.
3.3.3 When Fragmentation Occurs, Information Loss Can Be Signiﬁcantly
above Expected Rate.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is important to investigate the behavior of the
network in situations when the load, for short periods of time, is slightly above the
link capacity limit. Although in this case packet losses cannot be avoided, we want to
quantify how many packets are discarded.
The role of a PDC is to aggregate measurements - received from a number of
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PMUs or other PDCs - to a single stream that is then forwarded to the control point.
Measurements are correlated by time-tags. Depending on the number of streams that
are aggregated, the resulting UDP datagrams could exceed the threshold size beyond
which IP fragmentation occurs.
This size is dictated by the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the underlying
protocol. In our case, we use Ethernet that has a MTU of 1500 B. If the total size of
the UDP payload, the UDP header (8 B) and the IPv6 header (40 B) is above 1500
B, IP fragmentation will take place, and one UDP datagram will be encapsulated in
two (or more, if necessary) IP packets. At the receiver’s side a UDP datagram can be
reassembled only if all IP packets that carry its fragments are correctly received.
If any fragment is lost, the whole UDP datagram is considered to be lost as the
transport layer is not able to reassemble the datagram. In a toy example in Figure
3.5, we compare the consequences of two different loss patterns that are due to two
different scheduling strategies in the bottleneck queues. These are the best-case and
the worst-case loss patterns. In both cases the same fraction of bits is discarded. In the
best case the overall information loss equals the fraction of lost bits, whereas in the
worst case all the information is lost.
This suggests that when UDP datagrams are fragmented into two IP packets, an
optimal scheduler should not discard only one of the two corresponding IP packets.
The transmission of the other would use network resources without any beneﬁt, as it
would be discarded anyway at the receiver side. Hence, if one of the UDP datagram
fragments is discarded, the optimal scheduler would also discard all other IP packets
that carry fragments of the same UDP datagram. In the case when the offered trafﬁc is
above line capacity, a lower bound on the resulting loss probability, is
loss probability ≥ offered trafﬁc − line capacity
offered trafﬁc
(3.1)
In other words, if the offered trafﬁc is only slightly above the line capacity, ideally
only a small fraction of information should be lost.
We perform experiments to measure how close the system is to this optimal loss
probability, given the equipment and technology at our disposal. The IEEE Standard
C37.118.2-2011 states that a variable number of PMU measurements can be included
within a single frame. We develop a PDC trafﬁc emulator that enables us to vary the
size of the packets on the sender side. We examine two sending patterns. Sending
Pattern I (Figure 3.6(a)) mimics the scenario where no IP fragmentation occurs. One
UDP datagram results in one IP packet, and there is always time spacing between two
consecutive packets. Beginning with the target throughput, we calculate this time-
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Figure 3.5: Toy example. Label A and Label B packets represent two fragments of the
the same UDP datagram. Depending on the loss pattern the effect at the receiver might
be dramatically different.
spacing duration between two consecutive packets. Sending Pattern II (Figure 3.6(b))
emulates the situation when IP fragmentation occurs. In this case, one UDP datagram
results in two IP packets that are sent back-to-back. As in the ﬁrst case, waiting times
(now between groups of two IP packets) are calculated to meet the target throughput.
In both cases, alternate packets are labeled with A or B; Label A packets are sent ﬁrst,
Label B packets follow (see Figure 3.6).
We are interested in the number of successfully received bytes at the destination
end, as seen by the transport layer for various target throughputs and packet sizes. We
keep track of the number and labels of lost packets.
We use the UDP transport-layer protocol because TCP retransmits lost packets,
which is in our case superﬂuous as fresh measurements are generated at a high fre-
quency. For every experiment, we send 10000 IP packets labeled with A and 10000
packets labeled with B and we specify sending pattern (I or II), size of packets labeled
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(a) Pattern I (with spacing), Label A packet ﬁrst then Label B packet.
(b) Pattern II (back to back), Label A packet ﬁrst then Label B packet.
Figure 3.6: Sending patterns.
with A/B, and the target throughput.
We consider three datagram sizes (and thus implicitly three different labelB packet
sizes). Measurement results are depicted in Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9. Each point is
obtained via a single experiment. For each considered datagram size, on the left panel
we plot the number of successfully transmitted LabelA andB packets; and on the right
panel, the number of successfully decoded bytes at the transport layer (UDP datagram
payload). We also plot the curve that corresponds to the theoretical minimal-loss
probability (labeled “optimal”) in terms of number of bytes, as expressed in Equation
3.1. In the case of Sending Pattern I, measurement results for UDP datagram payload
follow very well the optimal curve. However, for Sending Pattern II, we observe that
the UDP datagram payload drops signiﬁcantly. We notice that the number of Label B
packets lost is also dramatically higher than for Pattern I.
3.3.4 Smaller Label B Packets Are More Likely to Be Discarded
Another observation we can make from Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 is that, when Sending
Pattern II occurs, the smaller Label B packets are, the more of them we lose. For
example, when the target throughput is 2.4Mbps (∼ 20% over the SHDSL link capacity),
and we set Label B packet size to 1452B, 726B, and 363B, we lose 37%, 56%, and 93% of
Label B packets, respectively. This is contrary to what might be expected, as smaller
packets require less time to be processed.
3.3.5 High Label-B Loss-Probability Leads to High Loss of Information
Keeping in mind the discussion about IP fragmentation and by examining the results
presented in Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 when Sending Pattern II occurs, we remark the
correlation between Label B packet loss and the signiﬁcant drop in goodput. As a result,
the number of UDP datagrams that can be used by the receiver drops dramatically.
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Figure 3.7: Experimental results. Label A packet size: 1452 B, Label B packet size: 1452
B. 10000 packets of each kind are sent.On the left: number of successfully received
packets. On the right: number of successfully received bytes as seen by transport layer.
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Figure 3.8: Same as Figure 3.7, except for Label B packet size: 726 B.
For example, when the target throughput is 2.4 Mbps (∼ 20% over the SHDSL link
capacity) and when Label B packet size is 363B, we can only retrieve up to 7% of the
measurement results that are sent.
Next, for Sending Pattern II, we compare experimental results with simulation
results, and we explain the phenomenon.
24
3.3. Deﬁning the Operating Region of the SHDSL Communication Channel

























   Pattern I
Labels A and B
Pattern II Label B
Pattern II Label A


























   Pattern I
Pattern II
Figure 3.9: Same as Figures 3.7 and 3.8, except for Label B packet size: 363 B.
3.3.6 SHDSL Modem Simulations
In order to verify and explain the results detailed above, we design a simulation pro-
gram. We use a discrete-event simulation to describe arrivals and departures from a
queue that corresponds to the outgoing interface of the line terminal. Based on the
experimental results from Section 3.3.2 we set the queue size to 50 and the queuing
discipline to FIFO/tail-drop.
Simulation results match experimental results
Throughout this section, we analyze the results for Sending Pattern II because we
identiﬁed previously that this sending pattern is the critical one.
As mentioned before, the purpose of having a simulator is to verify what we ob-
served in our experiments. To this end we show in Figures 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12, a
comparison of the results already shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 with the results we
obtain from our simulator for Sending Pattern II (back to back). We observe that, in all
scenarios, measurement and simulation results are in accordance with each other.
Small buffers with tail-drop policies cause undesired loss patterns
We use our discrete-time FIFO/tail-drop simulator to better understand the nature
of the phenomenon. We show in Figure 3.13(a), for a speciﬁc scenario (details in the
ﬁgure caption), the evolution over time of the cumulative number of packets of each
type that are successfully received when transmission follows Pattern II. The plotted
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Figure 3.10: Simulation vs measurement results for Sending Pattern II (back to back).
Label A packet size: 1452 B, Label B packet size: 1452 B. 10000 packets of each kind are
sent.
trend is similar in all scenarios with sending Pattern II. We observe that, after an initial
transient period, almost no Label B packets are successfully transmitted. Figure 3.13(a)
also shows that, even when starting with an empty queue, it takes less then one second
for Label B packets to start being excessively dropped. This shows that Label B packets
are systematically discriminated against and that, after a short transient period, very
few go through; whereas, Label A packets receive much better treatment.
In Figure 3.14 we show a possible occupancy of the queue at the arrival moment of
two back-to-back packets. There is room for only one packet. The tail-drop queuing
policy accepts the ﬁrst packet and forces the second to be dropped. We conjecture
that this is a typical situation (i.e., one free slot in the queue) and it results in Label B
packets always being dropped as they follow Label A packets.
We use the same parameters to simulate a system, with a difference that we replace
the tail-drop queuing policy with the datagram-aware scheduler: If a Label B packet
cannot be accepted, the scheduler also discards the corresponding Label A packet,
because they both carry fragments of the same UDP datagram. The expected effect
is similar to the expected behaviour of an optimal scheduler that discards all the
fragments of the same IP packet. We observe that the resulting effect corresponds to
26
3.3. Deﬁning the Operating Region of the SHDSL Communication Channel




































Figure 3.11: Same as Figure 3.10, except for Label B packet size: 726 B.
the theoretical optimum as expressed in Equation 3.1.
In Figure 3.13(b) we see the number of successfully received bytes as seen by
transport layer. If we compare two scheduling policies, we observe that the undesired
symptom disappears when we replace the tail-drop queuing policy with our datagram-
aware scheduler. In the case of the tail-drop queuing policy, the receiver would be
able to retrieve around 3% of the datagrams, whereas the datagram-aware scheduler
ensures retrieval of around 75% of datagrams. We conclude that the tail-drop queuing
policy (combined with a small buffer size) is indeed the cause of the undesired effect
we observe.
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Figure 3.12: Same as Figures 3.10 and 3.11, except for Label B packet size: 363 B.
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(a) Evolution of number of packets of each type
that are successfully transmitted.

































      scheduler
(b) Evolution of number of successfully received
bytes as seen by transport layer.
Figure 3.13: Simulation results. Comparison of two scheduling policies. Datagram A
size is 1452B, Datagram B size is 363, Target throughput is 2.6 Mbps, sending pattern is
II.
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Figure 3.14: Conjectured typical situation at the FIFO/tail-drop queue that corresponds
to the outgoing interface of the line terminal when the load is slightly above the
available throughput and once the transient period is ﬁnished. Label A and Label B
packets that arrive consecutively see a queue that can accommodate only the ﬁrst one
(Label A). This will result in almost no Label B packets in the queue, i.e., almost no
Label B packets successfully transmitted.
3.4 Discovering Performance Limitations of DSLAMs
During the exploitation of our network, unexpected delay patterns were detected. In
the following, we describe the observed problem.
PMUs are GPS-synchronized and they output measurement packets in the same
moment. This is done periodically, every 20ms, and it takes around 50ms from the
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moment the measurements are taken until the moment the PDC processes them.
Given that all the paths between PMUs and PDC are symmetrical, we would expect
that the packets are delivered nearly at the same time. But, this is not what is observed
at the PDC. Packets with the same time-stamp arrive with time-differences in the
order of several milliseconds. Given that this jitter represents around 10% of the overall
computation time, it is highly undesirable and, as it is unexpected, further investigation
is required. For this analysis, we show a simpliﬁed version of the communication-
network infrastructure in Figure 3.15.
Figure 3.15: EPFL-campus smart-grid communication network - simpliﬁed represen-
tation.
3.4.1 Problem Quantiﬁcation and Analysis
The very ﬁrst step was to quantify what was observed. To that end we ran the  
tool to capture trafﬁc. We did it at the Obervation point 1 from Figure 3.15. This is the
incoming interface of PDC. We see the (simpliﬁed) results below in Figure 3.16
There are several observations to make:
• There are 6 PMUs (2-7) that send trafﬁc periodically. We distinguish them based
on the source port (43002− 43007).
• All the packets in blue belong to the same measurement generation, i.e., they
have the same time-stamp. This pattern repeats every 20ms.
• Among the packets that belong to the same generation, we always observe packet
from PMU2 as the ﬁrst one, and packet from PMU7 as the last one. Packets from
PMUs 3-6 are always in between packets from PMU2 and PMU7, with the order
that varies.
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Figure 3.16: Captured trafﬁc at Observation point 1.
• Packets from the same generation are arriving with a time-window of around
8ms.
We calculate the observed throughput as follows. After adding 62B of headers to
74B of payload for PMUs 2-6 and 146B of payload for PMU7, we have 888B in total -
processed within 8ms. The observed throughput is then approximately 1Mbps. Given
that all the interconnecting links after DSLAM, which is the concentration point, have
capacities far above what is observed, we suspect that there might be a bottleneck in
one of the two devices that are shared by packets from all PMUs: DSLAM and Raspbery
Pi. Hence, we proceed by analyzing the throughputs supported by them.
Analysis ofRaspberryPi: Raspberry Pi is not intended to be used for high-performance
routing. In addition, in our setting, it is conﬁgured as an end-point of multiple IPv6-in-
IPv4 tunnels, so we suspect it can be the bottleneck. We conduct two simple experi-
ments. In the ﬁrst one, we analyze the throughput of Raspberry Pi when routing only
IPv4 packets. The measured throughput was around 50Mbps. Then we put additional
load by sending IPv6 packets. This way, we forced Raspberry Pi to perform additional
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processing due to IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneling, which is the usual workload in our network.
The measured throughput was around 30Mbps. In both cases, we used   as a tool
for packet generation and bandwidth measurement.
Hence, the conclusion is that Raspberry Pi is not the bottleneck, as the measured
throughput is well above 1Mbps, which is the observed bottleneck throughput.
Analysis of DSLAM: Unlike with Raspberry Pi, which is an open Debian-based sys-
tem, we have less control over DSLAM and its internals. Hence, we need to analyze
this device as a black-box. To this end, we run 	
 at the Obervation point 2 from
Figure 3.15. This is the incoming interface of Raspberry Pi. We see the (simpliﬁed)
results below in Figure 3.17.
Figure 3.17: Captured trafﬁc at Observation point 2.
All the conclusions from the analysis above from 	
 output at Observation
point 1 still hold. As the DSLAM is the ﬁrst device common to all the paths between
PMUs and PDC, it represents the bottleneck.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the design of the EPFL smart-grid communication
network and the results of the experiments performed on its infrastructure. When
designing the ﬁrst set of experiments, to test the operating region of the SHDSL com-
munication channel, we followed data transfer requirements described in the IEEE
C37.118.2-2011 standard. However, we were able to identify critical scenarios where
following these guidelines is not sufﬁcient.
We used off-the-shelf SHDSL line terminals. When IP fragmentation occurs, two
back-to-back packets arrive at the line terminal. When the reception rate exceeds the
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transmission rate, the packet queue is often full, and one or both incoming packets
are dropped, thus rendering the reassembly impossible. In some of the considered
scenarios, we ﬁnd that packets arriving ﬁrst are almost never lost, whereas a high
loss-rate of the packets arriving second dictates the drop in goodput. We attribute
this asymmetric behavior to the tail-drop queuing policy and small size of the queues
implemented inside line terminals.
The resulting effect is that, even if the load is just slightly above the capacity of the
SHDSL link, the goodput drops catastrophically. For example, when the offered load is
2.2Mbps, depending on the size of the packets, there are between 20% and 57% of lost
Label B packets, although the capacity is exceeded by only 10%. When the capacity is
exceeded by 20%, there are between 37% and 90% Label B packets that are lost. Thus, if
measurement results are sent in fragmented packets, there is a risk that there is at least
the same fraction of lost measurement results as the fraction of Label B packets that
are lost. Hence, the effect on our monitoring system would be severe.
There are two different approaches for mitigating the aforementioned issues. First,
a quick ﬁx is to implement datagram-aware schedulers for the bottleneck queues (we
have shown the beneﬁts of this solution in Figure 3.13).
In the second approach, if we want to avoid losses altogether, PMUs/PDCs should
implement trafﬁc shaping on machines that run real-time operating systems (Real-
Time Linux [45] for example). This would guarantee enough resources for processing
and sending/forwarding packets within the desired boundaries, and packets would
never be backlogged.
In the second set of experiments we conclude that DSLAM (ZyXEL SAM1316-22)
is the bottleneck in the system. It causes that the packets with the same time-stamps
arrive at the destination with time differences larger than expected. It is speciﬁed in the
device documentation that the outgoing interface is compliant with 10/100Base-TX
standards; hence, it is able to output packets at 10/100Mbps. Nevertheless, switching-
fabric throughput is not speciﬁed in the document and we suspect that this represents
the bottleneck in our system. Therefore, it needs to be ensured that the trafﬁc offered
by PMUs does not exceed 1Mbps, which is the throughput that can be supported by
the DSLAMs. Such a result is surprisingly bad and, in retrospect, this device probably
should have been avoided.
In the analysis of the identiﬁed problem, we use an assumption that the bottleneck
is located after (or within) the concentration point. Theoretically, it could be that
some PMUs or SHDSL modems need more time for processing and, as a consequence,
packets from those PMUs arrive later at DSLAM. We consider this option to be not very
likely (but we still keep it in mind), because the packet that is always observed ﬁrst
(PMU2) comes from the measurement point PC-2 that is the closest to the CM building
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where DSLAM is installed. This means that the connecting cable is the shortest one for
this measurement site, which translates to the shortest propagation time; this is the
explanation for why packets from PMU2 are always observed ﬁrst.
For the ﬁnal recommendation after describing both sets of experiments, we con-
clude that a trafﬁc management mechanism (currently out of scope of IEEE C37.118.2-
2011 standard) is necessary if we want to ensure that networking resources are suf-
ﬁcient. A possible solution is the integrated-services architecture (IntServ) [30] that
would guarantee Quality of Service. A sending device should go through a setup phase
for resource reservation. During this phase all intermediate networking devices accept
or reject the reservation depending on available resources and the trafﬁc speciﬁcations
advertised by the sender, namely maximum packet size, peak rate, burst tolerance, and
sustainable rate.
If we implement trafﬁc shaping mechanism on devices with real-time operating
systems with the integrated services network architecture, the system becomes much
more deterministic and packet losses are avoided.
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4 Security Vulnerabilities of the
Cisco IOS Implementation of the
MPLS Transport Proﬁle
4.1 Introduction
When studying technologies for smart-grid communication networks, it immediately
becomes evident that the MPLS Transport Proﬁle (MPLS-TP) is one of the key tech-
nologies [28]. Hence, when we began working on the topic, the natural ﬁrst step was
to evaluate MPLS-TP in detail. Therefore, we conducted a protocol analysis in our
custom-made testbed, during which some security vulnerabilities emerged. In this
chapter, we report on our ﬁndings about the attacks that are possible in MPLS-TP-
based communication networks.
In smart grids, MPLS-TP is mainly used for inter-control center communication of
measurement data (e.g, synchrophasor data from Phasor Measurement Units), and
control and protection commands over WANs. Given the critical nature of these type of
communications for the reliable operation of a smart grid, the communication infras-
tructure is required to satisfy high availability with bounded delay. MPLS-TP satisﬁes
these requirements in that it supports trafﬁc engineering to guarantee deterministic
delay for high priority trafﬁc, and it provides end-to-end protection - ensuring network
reliability and high availability. End-to-end protection is achieved by the MPLS-TP
OAM (Operations, Administration and Maintenance) framework that provides pro-
tection switching feature, controlled by bidirectional forwarding detection (BFD) and
protection state coordination (PSC) protocols. BFD detects failures in label-switched
paths (LSP), and PSC coordinates the protection switching.
The fact that an MPLS-TP network extends over a (usually unprotected) wide area
renders the communication network vulnerable to cyber intrusions by an attacker
with a malicious intention of compromising the smart grid’s operations. Hence, one
of the major challenges for a smart grid utility is to implement proper cyber security
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protection methods for its MPLS-TP based WAN.
There is a whole family of MPLS-TP-related RFCs [17, 24–27] and several among
them are security-related. However, we ﬁnd that the RFC-based security analysis
of MPLS-TP is complex due to fragmentation of pieces of information needed to
understand the big picture of which the pieces are spread among multiple RFCs. To
some extent, security-related problems are treated as “hot potatoes"; the responsibility
of securing different aspects of MPLS-TP in different RFCs is sometimes outsourced to
another RFC some of which are only informational and majority of which is without
straightforward guidelines. Consequently, the lack of holistic approach in securing the
MPLS-TP network makes the whole process difﬁcult to follow. For example, RFC 5085
[27] relies on IPsec to provide the security of MPLS-TP, but this is not always applicable
as there are some non IP ﬂows in some smart grid and other contexts that use MPLS-
TP. This led us to pose as a hypothesis that vendor solutions might not correctly
implement all of the required security. To test this hypothesis, we started an analysis of
several MPLS-TP implementations. In this chapter, we report on our ﬁndings with the
Cisco IOS implementation, Cisco being one of the leading manufacturers of network
equipment and with a large investment in smart grids.
In Section 4.2, we give an overview of the MPLS-TP features that are necessary to
understand the experiments we conduct. In Section 4.3 we describe the testbed, that
we build in the lab environment: it consists of eight virtual routers each running a
Cisco IOS image that supports MPLS-TP.
In Section 4.4, we describe how we were able to conduct the attacks. This was
possible in spite of us implementing the security guidelines that are available from
Cisco for IOS and MPLS-TP (which include IPSec and authentication of the control
plane). In some scenarios (not reported here) the available security measures were
sufﬁcient. However, we identiﬁed other scenarios, described below, where these
security measures were not sufﬁcient. In these latter scenarios, the attacker harms the
network at several points (e.g., disabling both working and protection LSPs) by using
the access to only one or two interfaces of a switch (e.g., on the protection LSP). We
achieved this by inserting forged BFD or PSC messages into the network, which induces
the label edge router (LER) into believing false information about the LSP status. In two
attacks, the LER disables the operational LSP. In another attack, the LER continues to
believe that a physically destroyed LSP is up and running. These spooﬁng attacks rely
on the assumption that an attacker gains physical access to cables in the network. This
assumption is consistent with reality because it is common to ﬁnd several unmanned
facilities, such as remote substations, in smart grid networks. Such substations are
where ﬁber-to-copper converters or optical terminators of an MPLS-TP network likely
reside. Moreover, some smart grid utilities also deploy pole-mounted optical repeaters
at every few kilometres along their electric transmission lines. Gaining physical access
to such physically exposed locations is usually achieved by breaking a window in a
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substation or climbing up a pole.
In addition to the ease of physical access to the attack locations, the equipment
required to mount the spooﬁng attacks is rather affordable. In MPLS-TP networks
where only optical links are used (no copper) an attacker can afford a NetFPGA-10G
card [46] with SFP+ modules in order to gain access to the network. Besides, it is not
uncommon to ﬁnd copper cables between optical termination nodes (ﬁber-to-copper
converters) and MPLS-TP routers (see Figure 4.4). The cost of equipment required to
launch a spooﬁng attack in such networks is almost negligible. An attacker can use
an off-the-shelf switch to connect his laptop computer to the network at the copper
cable segments. The attacker only injects very modest amounts of bogus trafﬁc from
his laptop computer and does not need to intercept legitimate trafﬁc, which remains
untouched. As such, our described attacks require only low-end, cheap equipment
that is readily available in all consumer electronics shops. In our experiments, we used
the second method to access the network in order to demonstrate the spooﬁng attacks
discussed in this chapter. Note that the nature of attacks remains the same no matter
which method of gaining access to the network is used.
In two of our attacks, the attacker needs to access only one cable; in another one,
he needs access to two cables. In all cases, an attacker gains more power to damage
the physical electrical infrastructure as a result of a more intelligent communication
network, i.e., an attacker can now bring down a physical target in the power grid from
a remote location by selectively manipulating trafﬁc at only one, or in some cases two,
locations in the communication infrastructure. In conventional power grid networks,
an attacker would have required physical access to sabotage the target. If we want
to compare the attacks described here to the one that involves simple wire cutting,
we can see that cutting wires harms only LSPs directly affected by the cut whereas we
show that our attacks are more powerful (LSPs in the other parts of the network are
also affected). In some sense, this is in contradiction with the expected beneﬁts of
smart grids: they should not make the electrical systems weaker than they are today. In
Section 4.5 we discuss countermeasures that are likely to thwart the described attacks.
4.2 MPLS-TP Protocol Overview
A label-switched path (LSP) is deﬁned as a one-way path that data follows from one
particular node (a router able to do label-switching) to a different node, where inter-
mediate nodes can be traversed. The two nodes where data enters and leaves the
LSP are called label edge routers (LER), and nodes traversed within the LSP are called
label-switching routers (LSR). MPLS-TP mandates that all LSPs go by pairs traversing
the same nodes and links on each direction, and that they be signaled as a single entity
(one single LSP identiﬁer is used); this characteristic is called co-routed bidirectional.
37
Chapter 4. Security Vulnerabilities of the Cisco IOS Implementation of the MPLS
Transport Proﬁle
In MPLS-TP, the control plane for signalling and recovering LSPs can be static or
dynamically conﬁgured. In smart grids, a static conﬁguration is commonly used by
network operators for security reasons, to avoid interacting with dynamic control
protocols (i.e., RSVP-TE, T-LDP) from other service providers; as we are in the context
of smart-grid communication networks, we use static conﬁguration of MPLS-TP LSPs
for our analysis.
Recovery is the ability of the network to become operational following the failure or
degradation of trafﬁc delivery caused by a network fault or a denial-of-service attack
on the network [25]. There are several types of recovery methods in MPLS-TP, and
in our testbed we analyze protection switching. Protection switching is a well-suited
method that provides fast repair and exists side-by-side with the static conﬁguration
of the control plane commonly used in smart grids. This method pre-allocates an
alternative bidirectional LSP to divert trafﬁc during a fault condition, uses BFD for link
failure detection with an almost immediate response time (i.e., less than 50ms) and has
a mechanism for coordinating the state of the protection provided to a working LSP
between both LERs. Within the protection switching scope, a working LSP is deﬁned as
the LSP where data runs under normal operating conditions; furthermore, a protection
LSP is the pre-allocated LSP where data is diverted from the working LSP in case of
network failure or degradation. The service delivered by both working and protection
LSPs is called an “MPLS-TP tunnel".
There are two different schemes for providing protection switching to an LSP. The
ﬁrst scheme is called “1+1", where the label edge router at the ingress of the MPLS-TP
tunnel transmits simultaneously the data on both working and protection LSPs, and
the label edge router at the egress of the MPLS-TP tunnel selects between working or
protection LSPs based on some predetermined criteria. The second scheme is called
“1:n" where the working LSP handles data under normal operating conditions; and only
if there is a defect, failure, degradation or request from network operator, the trafﬁc is
switched to protection LSP. For simplicity, in this chapter we discuss a particular case
of the second scheme called “1:1" where one pre-allocated protection LSP serves one
particular working LSP. The nature of the attacks we conduct is such that the security
weaknesses revealed in our testbed can be exploited in schemes “1+1" and “1:n" as
well, with exactly the same results.
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Figure 4.1: Format of a BFD Control Packet.
4.2.1 Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
BFD in MPLS-TP is a protocol that detects link failures within the MPLS-TP tunnel.
From the three types of messages described in [47], our focus is on the BFD control
packet thatwe are spooﬁng in our attack. TheBFDcontrol packet veriﬁes the continuity
of an LSP. A BFD session is established between label edge routers for each LSP within
the MPLS-TP tunnel. A LER sends a BFD control packet every 3.3 ms (this is the interval
recommended by IETF [25]); the BFD control packet is sent in-band in the LSP (i.e. is
switched at intermediate routers exactly like data packets in the LSP) and is intercepted
by the LER that terminates the LSP. When an LER observes that 3 consecutive BFD
control packets are not received, it declares the incoming LSP to be broken; as the two
directions of co-routed bidirectional LSPs can fail independently, the receiving LER
sends a BFD “Session Down" message in the reverse direction of the LSP to inform the
LER at the other end of the failure; then protection switching is triggered. In Cisco’s
implementation BFD control packets are sent every 4 ms instead of 3.3 ms.
In order to understand the attacks described in section 4.4, we include the format
of a BFD control packet in Figure 4.1 and provide relevant information for the ﬁelds
concerning our attacks. The ﬁrst of two ﬁelds for our testbed is the diagnostics (Diag )
ﬁeld, which is ﬁve bits long and reports a fault or defect condition between label edge
routers; from the 32 possible codes we are interested in two of them, a 0 means there is
no fault or defect condition to report and a code 1 stands for “Control Detection Timer
Expired", which in normal operating conditions is set when we miss three consecutive
BFD control packets. The second ﬁeld is the state (Sta) ﬁeld, which is two bits long and
refers to the state of the BFD session between label edge routers; here a value of zero
means “Administrative Down" (given by network operator), one stands for “Down",
two for “Init" (used during BFD session setup) and three for “Up".
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Figure 4.2: Format of a PSC Control Packet.
4.2.2 Protection State Coordination (PSC)
The PSC protocol is used to ensure that — whenever protection switching is triggered
in one of the unidirectional LSPs of an MPLS-TP tunnel — the protection switching is
also triggered for the remaining unidirectional LSP. This is in line with the co-routed
bidirectional feature of MPLS-TP LSPs described in Section 4.2.1. PSC protocol also
tells the LER whether the protection LSP is available, and if there is any inconsistency
in protection switching conﬁguration (timers, revertive functionality, etc.) between
LERs.
There are six different PSC protocol states, among which the normal state is the
default state when protection switching is enabled; and the unavailable state, which is
used when protection switching is disabled by network operator or unavailable due to a
failure on the protection LSP. A label edge router calculates the next PSC protocol state,
based on the priorities of the requests issued by three sources: local requests (which
can come from the network operator, control plane, management plane or speciﬁc
timers), the PSC message received from the peer label edge router, and the current PSC
protocol state. According to [17], the highest priority of the requests issued by any of
the sources described above corresponds to network-operator commands (“Clear",
“Lockout of Protection" and “Forced Switch"). Network-operator commands are used
by the attackers to launch the attacks on the PSC protocol described in Section 4.4.2.
For these attacks, we discuss two ﬁelds of the PSC control packet format (Figure 4.2).
First we have the 4-bit request (Request) ﬁeld that represents the PSC protocol state of
the local label edge router that is sent to the peer label edge router to be considered on
its next state computation. In this ﬁeld code 14 stands for “Lockout of Protection" and
indicates that protection switching is down as a result of a network operator command.
The second ﬁeld is the 8-bit fault path (FPath) ﬁeld that indicates which LSP (working
or protection) shall be affected by the Request ﬁeld.
4.3 Testbed Description
In this section, we describe the setting we used to evaluate MPLS-TP security. The
network topology that we used is shown in Figure 4.3 [48]. Depicted routers run
Cisco IOS that supports MPLS-TP; namely, we use Cisco Cloud Service router 1000V
(CSR1000V) IOS. We mount eight VMWare virtual machines (VM) conﬁgured with
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CSR 1000V images on two physical machines (four virtual routers per each of the two
physical machines). Each physical machine has an eight-core processor and 16GB of
RAM. We assign one processor core and 3GB of RAM for each of the four virtual routers
within one physical machine. The CSR 1000V 60-day evaluation license that we had
at our disposal gave us full access to all the CSR 1000V features at a throughput of 50
Mbps. To the best of our knowledge, Cisco’s other commercially available routers that
support MPLS-TP have no additional security-related features.
We conﬁgure our MPLS-TP network to follow a one-to-one (1:1) protection mech-
anism by conﬁguring a working LSP and a protection LSP between R2 and R7. A
working LSP follows the path R2-R1-R3-R5-R7, whereas a protection LSP follows the
path R2-R4-R6-R8-R7. We conﬁgure LSPs statically and use RSVP to reserve network
resources. In order to connect each virtual router, as well as two physical machines, we
use 1 Gbps links with full duplex conﬁguration. As MPLS TP recommends co-routed
bidirectional LSPs as described in Section 4.2, both directions of each link are assigned
25Mbps of bandwidth. Inside both the working and protection LSPs, we conﬁgure
a BFD session, described in Section 4.2.1, with a 4ms message interval and a 12ms
detection interval [49].
R1 R3 R5 R7






Figure 4.3: The Network topology with 1:1 Protection used in our MPLS-TP testbed.
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4.4 Vulnerabilities in MPLS-TP Protocol
In this section, we describe three attacks. In Section 4.4.1 we describe two BFD spooﬁng
attacks: In the ﬁrst one, we remove protection from a target LSP; and in the second one,
we disable fault detection in an LSP. In Section 4.4.2 we describe a PSC spooﬁng attack
in which we bring down an operational MPLS-TP tunnel. As discussed in Section 4.1,
we assume that the attacker can access the cables at one point (for the ﬁrst and third
attacks) or two points (for the second attack).
4.4.1 BFD Spooﬁng Attacks
As described in Section 4.2.1, BFD control messages are used to proactively monitor
the continuity of an LSP. In this section, we describe spooﬁng attacks associated with
BFD messages that enable an attacker to launch targeted attacks on a speciﬁc LSP.
Scenario I - Removing Protection from a Target LSP
In this attack, the attacker’s goal is to falsely inform a label edge router that a working
LSP is broken, even though there is no actual failure. This attack forces label edge
routers of an LSP to unnecessarily switch from a working LSP to a protection LSP.
In our experiment, ﬁrst we connected our switch to the cable of the working LSP
at point a in Figure 4.4. Then we connected our laptop b to the switch and sniffed for
BFD packets in order to gather information such as MAC addresses of LSRs R3 and
R5, MPLS label, the TTL value, and the BFD session number of the target LSP between
LERs R2 and R7. Finally, using the sniffed information, we created the forged packets
by using the Scapy [50] tool and sent them to R7 through the switch by using a simple
python code. The packets were manipulated such that we modiﬁed the Diagnostic
(Diag) ﬁeld and the State (Sta) ﬁeld of a BFD control packet shown in Figure 4.1; the
Diag ﬁeld was set to “Control Detection Time Expired" and the Sta to “Down" (Figure
4.5). Note that other Diag ﬁeld codes could also be used with similar results.
Upon reception ofBFDDown packets,R7 is deceived into believing that the forward
working LSP from R2 to R7 is down. In order to observe the result of this attack, we
sniffed at points c and d of Figure 4.41; we observed that R7 starts the protection
switching by sending to R2 three PSC packets via the protection LSP with a “Signal
Fail (SF)" message, and by sending BFD control packets via the working LSP with the
Sta ﬁeld set to “Down". R7 does this despite the fact that it also receives legitimate
BFD packets from R2 with Sta ﬁeld set to “Up". When R2 receives the BFD and
PSC messages from R7 through the working LSP and protection LSP (respectively), it
1Note that packet snifﬁng at points c and d is not part of the attack, we used it only to establish that
the attack works.
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Figure 4.4: BFD Spooﬁng Attack : Removing protection from a target LSP.
Figure 4.5: A wireshark capture of a spoofed BFD packet to remove protection from a
target LSP.
triggers the protection switching and sends to R7 three PSC control packets with a
“Signal Fail (SF)" message.
We observed that, by continuously injecting the forged BFD Down packets destined
to R7, we impede the working LSP from getting back on its feet - effectively removing
protection from the target LSP. This is possible because there is no mechanism for
detecting that the frequency with which the messages are coming is different from
what is expected. In other words, no matter how many forged messages we insert
within the expected period of 4ms, it does not raise any suspicion and those messages
are accepted as legitimate. Similarly, no suspicion is raised when a node receives a
steady mixture of “Up" and “Down" messages. As a ﬁnal outcome of the attack, in the
case of a fault in the protection LSP, the LERs would not have any alternative LSP to
switch to.
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Scenario II - Disabling LSP Fault Detection
The attacker’s goal in this attack is the inverse of the attack introduced above, i.e., he
aims to falsely inform label edge routers that a working LSP is up and running, while in
reality it is down due to a link failure somewhere along the path. The link failure can be
due to deliberate sabotage or a result of a random failure. In our experiment, we used
the set up in Figure 4.6 to demonstrate this attack. On the working LSP, we connected
two malicious switches b and d to the cables between R1 and R2 and between R5 and
R7. Then we connected two laptops a and c to the MPLS-TP network through these
two switches.
R3 R5 R7

















Figure 4.6: BFD Spooﬁng Attack: Disabling fault detection in an LSP.
From laptop a, we injected forged BFD “Session Up" packets (the Sta ﬁeld set to
“Up") destined to LERR2 as if they were sent from LERR7. Likewise, we injected forged
“Session Up" packets from laptop c destined to LER R7 as if they were sent from LER
R2. The two LERs processed these forged packets without raising any alarms in spite
of receiving more BFD “Session Up" packets than expected, as a result of the packets
injected from our laptops.
We then broke the link between R1 and R3, thus emulating a random link failure
condition, while we continued sending the forged “Session Up" BFD packets to both
label edge routers R2 and R7 from our two laptops. Again, we observed that the two
label edge routers R2 and R7 did not notice the change in the rate of received BFD
“Session Up" messages as a result of the missing authentic BFD messages from each
other. Hence, the forged BFD messages from our laptops tricked both label edge
routers into believing that the working LSP was still up and running, while in reality the
link between R1 and R3 was down. To test our hypotheses, we sent ping commands
from R2 to R7 and sniffed for trafﬁc in the working LSP at laptop a. At this location, we
observed ping requests sent from R2 to R7. We also observed that R2 did not receive
any ping replies on either of its interfaces. Hence, we conclude that R2 actually sent
the ping requests through the working LSP as if everything was ﬁne on this LSP.
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Figure 4.7: A wireshark capture of a spoofed PSC message to shutdown a working LSP
The general conclusion we can make from this experiment is that sending forged
BFD “Session Up" packets to both LERs of an LSP disables protection switching in the
presence of a link failure. Therefore, data sent through the working LSP from either end
of the LSP is silently dropped at the broken link. Such loss of data can have undesirable
consequences especially to real-time systems such as smart-grid applications.
4.4.2 PSC Spooﬁng Attack
In this attack, the goal is to instruct a label edge router to completely shutdown a target
MPLS-TP tunnel for particular working and protection LSPs. Based on our testbed-
experiment results, carrying out PSC spooﬁng attack is simpler compared to a BFD
spooﬁng attack due to the priority hierarchy of the protocol and to the plainness of
the requests for the change of the PSC protocol state, as described in section 4.2.2;
nevertheless, the results of the PSC spooﬁng attack can be devastating compared to a
BFD spooﬁng attack because the PSC message can completely stop the operation of a
target MPLS-TP tunnel.
For the attack carried out in the testbed, we inserted a switch between routers R4
and R6, and we plugged a laptop to the switch, as shown at points a and b in Figure
4.9. The only attributes we needed to gather were the MAC address of the target label-
switching router (R6) and the MPLS label, as opposed to several attributes needed for
BFD spooﬁng attacks.
We created two different types of PSC packets; one targeting the working LSP
and another one targeting the protection LSP. Both messages emulate an operator’s
"shutdown" commands executed at R2 for both the working and protection LSPs. We
generate the spoofed packets by manipulating the Request and the Fault Path ﬁelds.
For the PSC packet targeting the working LSP, we set the Request ﬁeld to “Forced switch
(12)" and the Fault Path ﬁeld to “Working (1)" (Figure 4.7) and for the one targeting the
protection LSP the Request ﬁeld is set to “‘Lockout of protection (14)" and the Fault
Path ﬁeld to “Protection (0)" (Figure 4.8) . Finally, we sent both packets to LER R7 via
R6.
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Figure 4.8: A wireshark capture of a spoofed PSC message to shutdown a protection
LSP
In order to observe the effectiveness of this attack, we setup a snifﬁng session on
both interfaces of router R7 (point c of Figure 4.9) (as before, such a snifﬁng session
is not part of the attack, only part of our observation). We observed that when R7
received the forged PSC packet targeting the working LSP, it assumed LER (R2) was
instructed by a network operator to switchover to protection LSP. As a result R7 also
locked out the working LSP and sent three PSC control packets back to R2 with the
Request ﬁeld set to "Forced switch", Fault Path set to “Working". When R7 received
the second forged PSC packet that targeted the protection LSP, again R7 assumed
that R2 was instructed by the network operator to lockout the protection LSP. Thus it
also locked out the protection LSP and replied back to R2 with three PSC packet with
Request ﬁeld set to "Lockout of protection (14)" and Fault Path to “Protection".
R3 R5 R7
















Figure 4.9: Network setup for PSC Spooﬁng attack.
The consequence of the attack is a complete shutdown of the MPLS-TP tunnel for
the transmission of data. Since the forged packets inserted during the attack have
the structure of a network operator’s command, the LERs cannot bring the MPLS-TP
tunnel up by themselves. Thus the network operator is required to explicitly issue a
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command to bring back the MPLS-TP tunnel to normal function.
4.5 Discussion and Countermeasures
In the previous section, we discussed spooﬁng attacks on BFD and PSC messages.
These attacks disrupt the proper operation of an MPLS-TP network. Such attacks are
possible because a label edge router does not have a means to verify whether received
BFD and PSC messages truly originate from the label edge router on the other end of
an LSP or whether they were forged messages. Therefore, an obvious solution to these
attacks is to implement message-origin authentication mechanisms.
RFC5880 [51] proposes an optional authentication scheme for protecting BFD
messages from spooﬁng attacks. Such a solution, if implemented with a proper key
management scheme, could prevent the BFD spooﬁng attacks similar to those intro-
duced in Section 4.4.1. However, the Cisco IOS MPLS-TP implementation, which we
used for our experiments, does not implement this authentication option.
Unlike BFD, the PSC protocol does not have any built-in security to protect it
from spooﬁng attacks. One solution for protection against PSC messages spooﬁng
attacks is to craft a built-in authentication mechanism, similar to the optional BFD
authentication (RFC5880), by using one of the optional TLV ﬁelds in a PSC packet.
If an MPLS-TP core network supports IP services, OAM messages such as BFD and
PSC messages can be tunnelled on top of an IP tunnel. In such cases, standard IP
security solutions such as IPsec or (D)TLS between label edge routers can be used
to provide end-to-end security, thereby preventing spooﬁng attacks. RFC5085 [27]
proposes IPsec as a solution to protect OAM protocols of MPLS/GMPLS networks if the
core network supports IP, VPN, or transport services. However, not all core networks are
required to support IP. For example, a smart grid MPLS-TP network that transports IEC
61850 based Multicast Sampled Value (MSV) and Generic Object Oriented Substation
Event (GOOSE) messages between substations or between a substation and a controller
is often implemented without IP [52].
An alternative solution for preventing spooﬁng attacks on BFD and PSC messages
in non-IP MPLS core networks is to use hop-by-hop security (MACsec). However,
Cisco does not support MACsec in its routers (it does support it in switches). One
minor drawback of using MACsec is that if any of the network devices in an LSP are
compromised, MACsec fails to achieve its purpose, i.e., forged BFD and/or PSC packets
injected at the compromised device will be processed as valid packets by a receiving
label edge router. Nonetheless, such attacks can be prevented by incorporating tamper
resistant security solutions such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to protect sensitive
data and by enforcing proper access control mechanisms to deny unauthorised access
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to the network devices. Note that implementing an ACL alone would not solve the
problem as the attack is conducted with spoofed packets. Since our ﬁndings show
that lack of MAC layer security exposes smart grid networks to various cyber-attacks,
we recommend that utilities implement MACsec or a variant of it in their MPLS-TP
networks.
4.6 Conclusion
MPLS-TP is one of the proposed technologies for WAN connectivity in the context of
smart grid. In this chapter, we have shown that, when it comes to the security aspects of
the standard, there is a discrepancy between RFCs and the Cisco IOS implementation
for MPLS-TP we evaluated, which is not surprising given the complexity of RFCs.
More speciﬁcally, we have observed that the Cisco IOS does not implement security
recommendations for OAM protocols, such as BFD and PSC, thus exposing them to
different spooﬁng attacks. In our testbed, to launch spooﬁng attacks on these two OAM
protocols we exploited the identiﬁed security vulnerabilities. By launching spooﬁng
attacks, we have shown that we could degrade the performance of an MPLS-TP network
by removing a protection LSP of an MPLS-TP tunnel. We have also demonstrated that
we can disable detection of a link failure in LSP by tricking label edge routers into
believing a failed link is still up and running. Finally we have shown that we can bring
the whole MPLS-TP tunnel down by sending forged operator PSC commands.
Our experiments with the Cisco IOS show that no protection against spooﬁng
attacks is provided for non-IP MPLS-TP OAM messages. Therefore, we recommend
that RFCs be more directive in proposing built-in security for OAM protocols. They
should mandate source authentication mechanisms for both BFD and PSC messages
or mandate MACsec or a variant of it as an alternative authentication solution when
built-in security is absent.
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5.1 Introduction
Speciﬁc time-critical applications (found for example in electrical networks, industrial
processes, high-frequency trading, online gaming, etc.) have such strict communication-
delay constraints that retransmissions following packet loss can be both detrimental
and superﬂuous. In smart grids, critical control applications require reliable informa-
tion about the network state in quasi-real time, within hard delay-constraints of the
order of approximately 10 ms. Measurements are streamed periodically (every 20 ms
for 50 Hz systems) by phasor measurement units (PMUs) to phasor data concentrators
(PDCs). In such settings, retransmissions can introduce delays for successive, more
recent data that in any case supersede older ones. Moreover, IP multicast is typi-
cally used for delivering the measurements to several PDCs. Hence, UDP is preferred
over TCP, despite its best-effort delivery approach. Increasing the reliability of such
unidirectional (multicast) UDP ﬂows is a major challenge.
5.1.1 Problems with MAC-Layer Parallel Redundancy Protocol
The parallel redundancy protocol (PRP) IEC standard [20] was proposed as a solution
for deployments inside a local area network (LAN) where there are no routers. Com-
municating devices need to be connected to two cloned (disjoint) bridged networks.
The sender tags MAC frames with a sequence number and replicates it over its two
interfaces. The receiver discards redundant frames based on sequence numbers.
PRP works well in controlled environments, such as a substation LAN, where net-
work setup is entirely up to the substation operator, who ensures that the requirements
of PRP are met (e.g., all network devices are duplicated). At a larger scale (for example,
a typical smart grid communication network that spans an entire distribution network)
routers are needed and PRP can no longer be used. Thus, a new solution is needed for
IP wide area networks (WANs).
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In addition to extending PRP functionality to WANs, the new design should also
avoid the drawbacks of PRP. The most limiting feature of PRP is that the two cloned
networks need to be composed of devices with identical MAC addresses. This con-
tributes to making network management difﬁcult. Furthermore, PRP duplicates all the
trafﬁc unselectively, which is acceptable for use in a LAN, but which cannot be done
in a WAN, because links can be expensive and unnecessary trafﬁc should be avoided.
Moreover, PRP has no security mechanisms.
Note that a parallel redundancy protocol for IP WANs needs to support IP multicast,
as this is used by modern smart grid applications.
Figure 5.1: A typical iPRP use-case in the context of smart grids. Devices (Phasor
Data Concentrators (PDC), Phasor Measurement Units (PMU)) are connected to two
overlapping network subclouds (labeled A and B). Some devices use an additional
LTE connection providing a low latency cellular service [53]. Every PMU streams data
to all PDCs, using UDP and IP multicast.
Concretely, Fig. 5.1 depicts a smart grid WAN where PRP cannot be directly de-
ployed: devices are multi-homed and each interface is assigned a different IP address.
Most devices have two interfaces connected to a main network cloud made of two
fail-independent network subclouds labeled “A” and “B”, while some have a third inter-
face connected to a 4G cellular wireless service (labeled “Swisscom LTE backbone” in
the ﬁgure). It is assumed that paths between interfaces connected to the “A” network
subcloud stay within it (and similarly with “B”). The “A” and “B” network subclouds
could be physically separated, however in practice they are most likely interconnected
for network management reasons.
A simple way to achieve the arrangement described before is to divide the network
into two logical subclouds, A and B. Then, by adjusting the routing weights of the links
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interconnecting the A and B subclouds, we can ensure that A → A and B → B trafﬁc
stays within A and B subclouds, respectively, thereby giving rise to fail-independent
paths. In such a setting, the interconnections will be used only for A ↔ B trafﬁc.
We need a solution that, similarly to PRP, takes advantage of network redundancy
for increasing the reliability of UDP ﬂows, and that works in scenarios such as the one
in Fig. 5.1.
The existence of fail-independent paths is fundamental for the optimal operation
of such a solution. However, in the event of a network-component failure, the paths
can partially overlap. Then, the solution should reap the maximum possible beneﬁts
by operating in a degraded-redundancy mode. In other words, if complete end-to-end
redundancy is no longer possible, the solution should continue to work.
In order for our solution to be easily deployed, we also require it to be transparent
to both the application and network layers: it should only require installation at end-
devices and no modiﬁcations to running application software or to intermediary
network devices (routers or bridges).
In this chapter we present the design and implementation of iPRP (the IP par-
allel redundancy protocol), a transport layer solution for transparent replication of
unidirectional unicast or multicast UDP ﬂows on multihomed devices.
5.1.2 iPRP
An iPRP host has to send different copies of the same packet over different paths.
With the current technology, a device cannot control the path taken by an IP packet,
beyond the choice of a destination address, exit interface and a type-of-service value.
Other ﬁelds, such as the IPv6 ﬂow label or source routing header extensions, are either
ignored or rejected by routers. Also, the type-of-service ﬁeld is used by applications
and should not be tampered with by iPRP. Hence, we assume that a choice of the path is
done at the sources by choosing communication interface and the destination address.
The job of iPRP is then to transparently replicate packets over the different interfaces
for the UDP ﬂows that need it, match corresponding interfaces, remove duplicates at
the receiver, and do this in a way that is resilient to crashes (see Section 5.5.7).
Not all trafﬁc requires replication, only certain devices and certain UDP ﬂows do
(time-critical data). Hence, replication needs to be selective: a failure-proof mech-
anism, transparent to applications, is required for detecting and managing packet
replication. It needs to correctly match the interfaces, so that independent paths are
used whenever they exist.
The iPRP protocol design is such that it does not interfere with the existing security
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mechanisms and does not introduce any new security weaknesses (see Section 5.6).
iPRP assumes that the network is trafﬁc-engineered; the critical UDP data streams
receive enough resources and are not subject to congestion. iPRP instantly repairs
packet losses due to failures or transient problems such as transmission losses. It does
not solve congestion problems due to under-dimensioned network links. TCP ﬂows
are not affected.
Our iPRP implementation is for IPv6, as it is being installed in our smart-grid com-
munication network (smartgrid.epﬂ.ch), that uses IPv6 (following the argument that
new network environments should avoid future transition problems and embrace IPv6
from the start). Our implementation is available at http://goo.gl/N5wFNt. Adaptation
to IPv4 is straightforward.
5.2 Related Work
As mentioned in Section 5.1, iPRP overcomes the limitations of PRP [20]. The authors
of [54] are aware of the fact that PRP is limited to LANs and suggest a direction for
developing PRP in an IP environment. Their suggestion is neither fully designed nor
implemented. Also, it requires that the intermediate routers preserve the PRP trailers
at the MAC layer, which in turn requires changes in all of the routers in the networks.
It does not address all the shortcomings of PRP (diagnostic tools, lack of IP multicast
support, need of special hardware). In contrast, our transport layer approach does not
have these drawbacks.
Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [55] is used in multi-homed hosts. It allows TCP ﬂows
to exploit the host’s multiple interfaces, thus increasing the available bandwidth for
the application. Like MPTCP, iPRP is a transport layer solution and is transparent
to network and application. Unlike MPTCP, iPRP replicates the UDP packets on the
parallel paths, while MPTCP sends one TCP segment on only one of them. In a case of
loss, MPTCP resends the segment on the same path until enough evidence is gathered
that this path is broken. So, a lost packet is repaired after several RTTs (not good for
time-critical ﬂows).
Similarly, link aggregation control protocol (LACP) [56] and equal-cost multi-path
routing (ECMP) [57] require seconds for failover. LACP enables the bundling of several
physical links together to form a single logical channel. The failure of a link is discov-
ered through the absence of keep-alive messages that are sent every 1−30 s. ECMP can
be used together with most routing protocols in order to balance trafﬁc over multiple
best paths when there is a tie. In a case of failure, it relies on the reconﬁguration of the
underlying routing protocol, that is commonly detected by the absence of keep-alive
messages.
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Network coding exploits network redundancy for increasing throughput [58], and
requires intermediary nodes to recode packets (specialized network equipment needed).
Also, it is not suitable for time-critical applications as typically packets are coded
across “generations” which introduces decoding delays. Source coding (e.g. Fountain
codes [59]) can be useful for the bursty transmissions of several packets. However,
it adds delay, as encoding and decoding are performed across several packets (not
suitable for UDP ﬂows with hard-delay constraints).
Multiprotocol-label-switching transport-proﬁle (MPLS-TP) 1+1 protection feature
[25] performs packet duplication and feeds identical copies of the packets in working
and protection path. On the receiver side, there exists a selector between the two; it
performs a switchover based on some predetermined criteria. However, some time
is needed for fault detection and signaling to take place, after which the switchover
occurs. Hence, a 0-ms repair cannot be achieved.
Multi-topology routing extends existing routing protocols (e.g. [60]) and can be used
to create disjoint paths in a single network. It does not solve the problem of transparent
packet replication, but can serve as a complement to iPRP in the following way. On top
of the underlying network (base topology) additional class-speciﬁc topologies can be
created as a subset of base topology. We can use this feature to deﬁne fail-independent
A and B subclouds in order to ensure fail-independent paths between sources and
destinations.
Another method to ensure the discovery of fail-independent paths is software-
deﬁned networking (SDN) [19]. The centralized controller is aware of the overall
network topology and can impose routing rules in a way that guarantees independent
paths/trees between all the hosts.
5.3 A Top-Down View of iPRP
In this section we ﬁrst go over high-level design decisions we had to make during the
development of the iPRP protocol and then succinctly describe the resulting design.
iPRP aims to provide reliable end-to-end communication between multi-homed hosts.
The very ﬁrst question that emerges is the choice of a TCP/IP layer where iPRP should
be placed. Among others, iPRP needs to support scenarios where the trafﬁc is carried
over a shared network infrastructure e.g., a telecom network operator provides connec-
tivity for smart-grid services [61]. In this case, end-users do not control intermediate
routers. Hence, the routers should not be aware of the existence of iPRP. Consequently,
we put network transparency as a requirement which leads us to a solution that places
iPRP above the network layer. Taking this into account a possible solution can be to
place iPRP at the application layer. This would imply that all legacy applications that
are traditionally used would need to undergo changes in order to be compatible with
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the iPRP protocol. Again, we opt for an application-transparent solution which leads
us to a choice of a transport-layer solution.
The next choice to make was whether all the trafﬁc originated at a sender should be
replicated. Having in mind that bandwidth over WAN links can be of limited capacity
we opt here for a solution that replicates trafﬁc selectively. The control of this feature is
left to users through a simple conﬁguration of the UDP port numbers that correspond
to services that demand high reliability of packet delivery.
The next choice was that of a mechanism to inform a sender about the alternate IP
addresses (unicast or multicast) of the receivers, so as to establish redundant paths.
Classic solutions like PRP use cloned address networks. Cloned IP addresses are not an
option of iPRP as users do not necessarily control and manage all the interconnecting
networks.We solve this problem by designing a lightweight, secure and crash-resilient
signaling protocol. It also takes into account speciﬁcities of the multicast communi-
cation e.g., it avoids ﬂooding of senders with signaling messages from large groups
of multicast receivers. It is a plug and play protocol initiated whenever a new sender
emerges and completely transparent to the application layer.
Furthermore, we needed a mechanism for discard of duplicates, which can cope
with packet reordering due to the network, and crash failures of the hosts. Existing
duplicate-discard mechanisms such as the one used by PRP do not perform well under
such packet-reordering and host failures. So, we also put in place a stateless protocol
for redundant-packets removal.
The resulting design of iPRP is as follows. iPRP senders and receivers are expected to
have multiple network interfaces. Applications are identiﬁed by the UDP port used to
receive data. To enable iPRP for a certain application at the receiver, the port on which
the application is listening needs to be added to the list of iPRP monitored ports (see
Section 5.4.3). Receiving data on an iPRP monitored port automatically triggers an iPRP
session between the sender and the receiver (see Section 5.5). Within this session, the
iPRP software running on the source host learns the receiver’s network interfaces from
the iPRP software running on the receiver. It uses the conﬁgured rules to match local
interfaces to the receiver’s remote ones. It then proceeds to capture the application’s
outgoing packets, encapsulates them in iPRP data messages addressed to the receiver’s
remote interfaces (according to the determined matching), and replicates them over
the local interfaces. At the receiver, the iPRP software decapsulates the original packets,
discards duplicates (Section 5.5.5), and delivers them to the receiver application.
Hosts having multiple interfaces is not a strict requirement, but is desirable. In
cases where the sender or the receiver have a single interface, iPRP still works, but the
paths taken by the replicated packets join at a certain point, which becomes a single
point of failure.
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5.4 Operation of iPRP
5.4.1 How to Use iPRP
iPRP is installed on end-devices with multiple interfaces: on streaming devices (the
ones that generate UDP ﬂows with hard delay constraints) and on receiving devices
(the destinations for such ﬂows).
Streaming devices (such as PMUs) do not require special conﬁguration. Streaming
applications running on such devices beneﬁt from the increased reliability of iPRP
without being aware of its existence. iPRP operates as a modiﬁcation to the UDP layer.
On receiving devices the only thing that needs to be conﬁgured is the set of UDP
ports on which replication is required. For example, say that an application running
on a PDC is listening on some UDP port for measurement data coming from PMUs.
After iPRP is installed, this port needs to be added to the list of iPRP monitored ports in
order to inform iPRP that any incoming ﬂows targeting this port require replication.
The application does not need to be stopped and is not aware of iPRP.
Nothing else needs to be done for iPRP to work. In particular, no special conﬁgura-
tion is required for intermediary network equipment (routers, bridges).
5.4.2 General Operation: Requirements for Devices and Network
iPRP provides 1 + n redundancy. It increases, by packet replication, the reliability of
UDP ﬂows. It does not impact TCP ﬂows.
iPRP-enabled receiving devices conﬁgure a set of UDP ports as monitored. When a
UDP packet is received on any of the monitored ports, a one-way soft-state iPRP session
is triggered between the sender and the receiver (or group of receivers, if multicast
is used). Soft-state means that: (i) the state of the communication participants is
refreshed periodically, (ii) the entire iPRP design is such that a state-refresh message
received after a cold-start is sufﬁcient to ensure proper operation. Consequently, the
state is automatically restored after a crash, and devices can join or leave an iPRP
session without impacting the other participants.
Within an iPRP session, each replicated packet is tagged with an iPRP header
(Section 5.5.4). It contains the same sequence number in all the copies of the same
original packet. At the receiver, duplicate packets with the same sequence number are
discarded (Section 5.5.5). The original packet is reconstructed from the ﬁrst received
copy and forwarded to the application.
In multicast, all devices in the group of receivers need to run iPRP. If only some of
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the receivers support iPRP, these trigger the start of an iPRP session with the sender
and beneﬁt from iPRP; however, the others stop receiving data correctly. The use of
source-speciﬁc multicast (SSM) is recommended (see [62]).
All iPRP-related information is encrypted and authenticated. Existing mechanisms
for cryptographic key exchange are applied (security considerations in Section 5.6) .
5.4.3 UDP Ports Affected by iPRP
iPRP requires two system UDP ports (transport layer) for its use: the iPRP control
port and the iPRP data port (in our implementation 1000 and 1001, respectively).
The iPRP control port is used for exchanging messages that are part of the soft-state
maintenance. The iPRP data port receives data messages of the established iPRP
sessions. iPRP-capable devices always listen for iPRP control and data messages.
The set of monitored UDP ports, over which iPRP replication is desired, are not
reserved by iPRP and can be any UDP ports. UDP ports can be added to/removed
at any time from this set during the iPRP operation. Reception of a UDP packet on a
monitored port triggers the receiver to initiate an iPRP session. If the sender is iPRP-
capable, an iPRP session is started (replicated packets are sent to the iPRP Data Port),
else regular communication continues.
5.4.4 Matching the Interconnected Interfaces of Different Devices
One of the design challenges of iPRP is determining an appropriate match between the
interfaces of senders and receivers, so that replication can occur over fail independent
paths. To understand the problem, consider Figure 5.1 where the PMUs and PDCs
have at least two interfaces. The A and B network subclouds are interconnected.
However, the routing is designed such that a ﬂow originating at an interface connected
to subcloud A with a destination in A will stay in subcloud A. A potential problem can
arise if a sender’s interface, say SA, intended to be connected to the A subcloud, is
mistakenly connected to the B subcloud, and vice-versa. Then one path from source
to destination will go from SA (on subcloud B) to the destination interface DB (on
subcloudB), and conversely on the other path. Following the routing rules, these ﬂows
will use interconnecting links between A and B subclouds. This is not desirable as
these links can be of insufﬁcient capacity because they are not intended to carry such
trafﬁc. Furthermore, it is no longer guaranteed that such paths are disjoint. PRP avoids
this problem by requiring two physically separated and cloned networks. iPRP does
not impose these restrictions. Hence, iPRP needs a mechanism to match interfaces
connected to the same network subcloud.
To facilitate appropriate matching, each interface is associated with a 4-bit identi-
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ﬁer called iPRP Network subcloud Discriminator (IND), which qualiﬁes the network
subcloud it is connected to. The iPRP software in end-devices learns each of the in-
terfaces’ INDs automatically via simple preconﬁgured rules. Network routers have no
notion of IND. A rule can use the interface’s IP address or its DNS name. In our imple-
mentation, we compute each interface IND based on its fully qualiﬁed domain name.
In Figure 5.1, the rule in the iPRP conﬁguration maps the regular expression   to
the IND value ,   to IND , and 	
		 to IND , respectively.
The receiver periodically advertises the IP addresses of its interfaces, along with
their INDs to the sender (via 
 messages). The sender compares the received
INDs with its own interface INDs. Only those interfaces with matching INDs are
allowed to communicate in iPRP mode. In our example, IND matching prevents iPRP
to send data from a PMU A interface to a PDC B interface. Moreover, each iPRP data
packet contains the IND of the network subcloud where the packet is supposed to
transit (see Section 5.5.4). This eases the monitoring and debugging of the whole
network. It allows us to detect misconﬁguration errors that cause a packet expected on
an A interface to arrive on a B interface.
5.5 Protocol Description
The iPRP message exchange is divided into two planes: control plane and data plane.
The control plane is responsible for exchange of messages required to establish and
maintain an iPRP session. The data plane is responsible for replication and de-
duplication of time-critical UDP ﬂows. Note that control plane messaging is non-time
critical and far less frequent than data plane (data plane ∼ ms, control plane ∼ s).
The data plane operation is divided into two phases: replication phase and dupli-
cate discard phase. Next, we discuss the operation of each plane and the description
of key elements of the iPRP protocol in detail.
5.5.1 Control Plane
The control plane is used for exchange of messages to establish and maintain an iPRP
session. The iPRP session establishment is triggered when a UDP packet is received
at some monitored UDP port p. In Fig. 5.2, UDP port p is made monitored at t1 at the
receiver, by adding it to the list of monitored ports. This triggers the establishment of
an iPRP session, i.e., the receiver’s soft-state-maintenance functional block (Fig. 5.3)
adds the sender to the list of active senders (Alg. 1).
The iPRP-capability-advertisement functional block (Fig. 5.3) at the receiver, sends

 to the control port of the sender every TCAP seconds (t2 in Fig. 5.2, Alg.
2). This message informs the sender that the receiver is iPRP enabled and provides
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Algorithm 1: (At the receiver) Soft-state maintenance (keeps the list of active
senders up-to-date)
1 while true do
2 remove inactive hosts from the list of active senders (last-seen timer expired);
3 for every packet received on one of the monitored ports or on iPRP Data Port
do
4 if the source is in the list of the active senders then
5 update associated last-seen timer;
6 else




Algorithm 2: (At the receiver) iPRP capability advertisement
1 while true do
2 compute Tbackoff (Section 5.5.6);
3 listen for   until Tbackoff expires;
4 send   messages to all hosts in the list of active senders from which
no   are received;
5 sleep TCAP − Tbackoff;
6 end
information required for selective replication over alternative paths. It contains: (1)
the iPRP version; (2) INDs of the network subclouds to which the receiver is connected,
to facilitate IND matching (see Section 5.4.4); (3) the source and destination UDP
port numbers of the packet that triggered the establishment of the iPRP session; (4)
in multicast, the multicast IP address of the group; (5) in unicast, IP addresses of all
receiver interfaces; (6) a symmetric, short-lived cryptographic key for authentication
and encryption of the iPRP header (Section 5.6)
On receiving the  , the iPRP-session-maintenance functional block (Fig.
5.3) at the sender acknowledges it with an  . The   contains the list of
sender IP addresses which are used by the receiver to subscribe to alternate network
subclouds to receive data through SSM. In multicast, the receivers send   after
a back-off period (Section 5.5.6) to avoid ﬂooding. The   message also serves
as a terminating message for impending  s, thereby preventing a ﬂood (Alg. 2).
To complete the iPRP session establishment, the iPRP-session-maintenance func-
tional block performs IND matching (section 5.4.4) and creates a peer-base entry (t3
in Fig. 5.2, Alg. 3). The peer-base contains all information needed by the sender for
replication of data packets.
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Algorithm 3: (At the sender) iPRP session maintenance
1 while true do
2 remove aged entries from the peer-base;
3 for every received  message do
4 if there is no iPRP session established with the destination then
5 if IND matching is successful then
6 establish iPRP session by creating new entry in the peer-base;
7 send   message;
8 end
9 else




The second goal of the control plane it to maintain an iPRP session. To this end,
the   messages are used as keep-alive messages (Alg. 3). The iPRP session is
terminated if no   message is received for a period of 3TCAP . These messages
are sent to a sender as long as it is present in the list of active senders. The list of active
senders is maintained by the soft-state-maintenance functional block by updating the
last-seen timer (Alg. 1) when a new data packet is received. Sessions that are inactive
for more than Tinactivity are terminated.
For each new iPRP session, a corresponding iPRP session establishment is triggered.
If any of the required steps could not be completed due to message loss or to an iPRP
incapability, an iPRP session is not established and packets are not replicated.
Addition or removal of new interfaces at the sender or receiver is communicated by
the   messages and the peer-base is updated accordingly. Speciﬁcally, when an
  is received for already established iPRP sessions, the peer-base is updated in
the following ways. Newly received INDs, which are successfully matched are added to
the peer-base. On the contrary, INDs in the peer-base that cannot be matched with any
of the received INDs, are removed from the peer-base after conﬁrmation from multiple
consecutive  s (to handle the effect of the backoff algorithm in Section 5.5.6).
5.5.2 Data Plane: Replication Phase
The replication phase occurs at the sender to send out data plane messages once the
iPRP session is established. The replication functional block (Fig. 5.3) on the sender
intercepts all outgoing packets destined to UDP port p of the receiver. These packets
are subsequently replicated and iPRP headers (section 5.5.4) are prepended to each
copy of the payload. iPRP headers are populated with the iPRP version, a sequence-
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number-space ID (SNSID - unique identiﬁer of an iPRP session), a sequence number,
an original UDP destination port, and IND. The 32-bit sequence number is the same
for all the copies of the same packet. The destination port number is set to the iPRP
data port for all the copies. An authentication hash is appended and the whole block is
encrypted. Finally, the copies are transmitted as iPRP data messages over the different
matched interfaces (see Alg. 4, t4 in Fig. 5.2).
Algorithm 4: (At the sender) Packet replication
1 for every outgoing packet do
2 check the peer-base;
3 if there exists an iPRP session that corresponds to the destination socket then
4 replicate the payload;
5 append iPRP headers incl. seq. number;
6 send packet copies;
7 else
8 forward the packet unchanged;
9 end
10 end
5.5.3 Data Plane: Duplicate Discard Phase
The duplicate discard phase occurs at the receiver once an iPRP session is established
to ensure that only one copy of replicated packets is forwarded to the application.
Upon reception of packets on the iPRP data port, the associated last-seen timer is
updated (see Alg. 1) and the packets are forwarded to the duplicate-discard functional
block (Alg. 5). It decrypts the iPRP header at the beginning of the payload using the
symmetric key used in   message. Then, function  	

 (Section
5.5.5 - Alg. 6) is called. Based on the sequence-number-space ID (SNSID - unique
identiﬁer of an iPRP session) and the sequence number, the packet is either forwarded
to the application or discarded. The ﬁrst received copy should reach the application,
subsequent copies are discarded. The replication is thus rendered transparent to the
sender and receiver applications. In Fig. 5.2 we show two scenarios after the time t4; in
one case both copies are delivered, in the other, one packet is lost.
5.5.4 The iPRP Header
Fig. 5.4 shows the position and the ﬁelds of the iPRP header used in data packets. The
SNSID is used to identify an iPRP session. This identiﬁer is unique across all iPRP
sessions terminating at the same receiver, thereby allowing multiple iPRP sessions on
the same machine. In our implementation, it is chosen as a concatenation of the source
IPv6 address, the source UDP port number of the socket to which the application writes
the packet and a 16-bit reboot counter.
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Algorithm 5: (At the receiver) Duplicate discard
1 for every packet received on iPRP data port do
2 get sequence number space ID (  );
3 get sequence number ( );
4 if it is the ﬁrst packet from this    then
5   	 ←  ;    
6 remove iPRP header;
7 reconstruct original packet;





11 remove iPRP header;
12 reconstruct original packet;
13 forward to application;
14 else




The SNSID is used by a receiver to tie the packets with different source IP addresses
that belong to the same iPRP session. When a new receiver joins a multicast group
with an already established iPRP session, it uses the source IP address in the SNSID to
uniquely identify the sender of the packets and the source port number in the SNSID to
uniquely identify the streaming application on the sender. However, in case of a crash
and reboot of the sender, the sequence number is reset. Then, a new reboot counter in
the iPRP header differentiates packets belonging to the new iPRP session from those of
the old iPRP session, thereby ensuring a seamless recovery at the receiver.
To maintain the format of the iPRP header for an IPv4 implementation, we suggest
repeating source IPv4 address four times at the place of source IPv6 address. The
original destination UDP port number is included to allow for the reconstruction of
the original UDP header. The iPRP header is placed after the inner-most UDP header.
So, iPRP works well, even when tunneling is used (e.g., 6to4).
Like many protocols (such as DTLS, VPN, VXLAN, 4in6, etc.), iPRP adds its own
header to the packet payload. In order to avoid packet fragmentation, we adopt the
same solution as any tunneling protocol: at the sender, iPRP reduces the interface
MTU size to the minimum of 1280 bytes required by IPv6. In practice, typical MTU
values are closer to the IPv6-recommended 1500 bytes. This leaves a margin for the
inclusion of the iPRP and other tunneling protocol headers.
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5.5.5 The Discard Algorithm
The redundant copies of a packet are eliminated by a discard algorithm running at
the receiver. In scenarios where the packets are received out-of-order, the discard
algorithm proposed for PRP [63] delivers several copies of the same packet to the
application. The function  	
 (Alg. 6) avoids this issue. It is used by Alg. 5
to decide if a packet sequence number corresponds to a fresh packet. We use 32-bit
unsigned integer sequence numbers, large enough to avoid the wrap-around problem.
Algorithm 6: Function to determine whether a packet with sequence number
 corresponds to a fresh packet in the sequence number space ID .
The test “ follows ” is performed for 32-bit unsigned integers using subtraction
without borrowing as “”.
1 function  	
 
2 if   then
3 return  ! ;    	
 
	
4 else if  follows   then
5 put SNs [ +1, -1] in " ;
6 remove the smallest SNs until "  has #"$ entries;





10 if  is in "  then
11 remove  from " ;












Alg. 6 tracks the following variables per iPRP session, identiﬁed by a sequence
number space ID ():
•   – highest sequence number of a packet received before the current packet,
• "  – sequence-number list of delayed packets.
"  is bounded to a maximum of #"$ < 231 entries. #"$ is the maxi-
mum sequence-number difference accepted by the application. In practice, we can
take #"$ > R× Tlate, where R is an upper bound on packet rate of the streaming
application that corresponds to an iPRP session and Tlate is the time after which pack-
ets are deemed out-of-date, thus irrelevant. Consequently, if a packet is received with a




The value of   is conﬁgurable and depends on the targeted application. For
example, in our smart-grid setting, there is a hard delay-constraint of 20ms (any packet
older than this can be safely discarded). To be conservative, we allow packets with
the delays of up to Tlate = 50 ms. We set   to 1024, high enough to support any
realistic PMU streaming rate.
iPRP and its discard algorithm are able to recover after unexpected events (crashes
and reboots). A problem can occur if, after a reboot of a sender, the same sequence
numbers are reused. Then, fresh packets can be wrongly discarded as the receiver
would be deceived into believing that it had already delivered such packets. This
problem can be ﬁxed by imposing handshakes between senders and receivers. How-
ever, such a solution is not appropriate if multicast is used and, furthermore, it would
violate soft-state property. Our solution is to have a sender maintain a reboot counter
that deﬁnes different sequence-number spaces within the same sender machine (see
Section 5.5.4). Therefore, when a new reboot counter is encountered, the receiver
creates a new 	
, thereby resetting 	. Following a reboot of a receiver, all the
receiver’s counters are initialized upon the reception of the ﬁrst iPRP data packet.
As mentioned earlier, the algorithm keeps track of one variable and of one list per
iPRP session. The most expensive operation is searching the list (line 10). However, in
practice, 	 is limited to few entries. The algorithm can be further optimized for a
O(1) time complexity by using a hash table implementation for 	. Additionally,
the algorithm is designed to have a ﬁxed memory usage: size(	) bytes.
Before proving the correctness of the algorithm, we need to introduce some deﬁni-
tions. We say that a received packet is valid if it arrives in order or if it is out-of-order
but not later than Tlate. Formally, this means that a packet received at time t with
	 = α is not valid if some packet with 	 = β > α+   was received before t.
Furthermore, let Δ be an upper bound on the delay jitter across all network sub-





, where δ denotes the one-way network latency. Also, recall that Tinactivity
is used to terminate inactive sessions (Section 5.5.1).
Theorem 1 (Correctness of the discard algorithm). IfR×Δ < 231 andR× (Tinactivity +
Δ) < 231, then Alg. 6 guarantees that: (1) no duplicates are forwarded to the application
and (2) the ﬁrst received valid copy of any original packet is forwarded to the application.
The proof is lengthy and is given in the appendix of this chapter. To understand
the practicality of the conditions in the theorem, note that Tinactivity is in the order
of seconds and is much larger than Δ. Therefore, the only condition to verify is
R × (Tinactivity + Δ) < 231, which for, say Tinactivity = 10s and Δ = 100ms, requires
R < 2× 108 packets per second – a rate much higher than ever expected.
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5.5.6 The Backoff Algorithm
The soft-state in a multicast iPRP session is maintained by periodic advertisements
( ) sent to the source by each member in the multicast group of receivers. We
want to prevent “message implosion” at the source for groups of receivers ranging
from several hosts to millions. Failing to do so can have a similar effect as a denial-
of-service attack. The source would be overwhelmed with processing   if all
the multicast group members would send them. Nevertheless, if the source waits too
long before receiving at least one  , the start of the iPRP operation would be
delayed. This is why we also require the source to receive an   within at most
D = 10s after the start of the loop in Alg. 2 (executed periodically every TCAP = 30s).
A similar problem was studied in the literature on reliable multicast, where ACK
implosion at the source needs to be avoided. To our knowledge, the solution that
best ﬁts our scenario was proposed by Nonnenmacher and Biersack [64]. We adopt
it in our design: each receiver performs a random backoff before transmitting an
 . The source acknowledges each   by an  . The reception of
an   before the expiry of the backoff timer inhibits any receiver from sending
its  . The backoff timer follows a ﬂipped truncated exponential distribution
(inaptly called “exponential” in [64]), deﬁned by a PDF on [0, D] that increases toward
D, fX(x;λ,D)
def.
= λeλx(eλD − 1)−1 · 1{x∈[0,D]}.
Due to the back-off algorithm, a multicast iPRP sender may not receive  s
from the same receiver in two consecutive cycles. As different receivers can have inter-
faces with different INDs active, the consecutive  s seen by the sender can have
different INDs. In cases when an   is received from a receiver with fewer inter-
faces, if the missing INDs would be immediately removed from the sender’s peer-base,
the replication on these network sub-clouds would be adversely affected. To mitigate
this problem, removal of INDs from the peer-base is done only after conﬁrmation from
multiple consecutive  s (see Section 5.5.1).
We implement the backoff computation of [64] by CDF inversion. A uniform
random variable U ∈ [0, 1] is obtained via a random number generator. Next, the
backoff is set to Tbackoff = λ−1 ln(1 + (eλD − 1)U) (Alg. 2, line 2). We pick λ = 25/D.
See [62] for a further discussion.
5.5.7 Robustness and Soft-state
iPRP is a soft-state protocol that is robust against host failures and supports joining
or leaving the hosts from the network at any time, independently of each other. In a
multicast case, it is expected that a new iPRP-capable receiver can show up (or simply
crash and reboot) after an iPRP session with other receivers was established. Then, the
new receiver will immediately be able to process packets received at the iPRP data port
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without the need to exchange control messages.
The iPRP control-message exchange does not rely on the availability of any par-
ticular network subcloud, making our protocol robust to network failures. Once the
soft-state maintenance functional block learns about alternative network subclouds,
  messages are sent over all of them. Furthemore, the control plane commu-
nication to the reserved iPRP control port is secured (see Section 5.6). The security
algorithm for iPRP header protection can be chosen as part of the conﬁguration.
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Figure 5.2: Message sequence chart for typical scenario when iPRP-capable devices































Figure 5.3: Overview of the functional blocks.
Figure 5.4: Location and ﬁelds of the iPRP header.
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5.6 Security Considerations
The iPRP protocol design is such that it does not interfere with upper-layer security
protocols. However, in addition, we needed to provide security for the iPRP header
itself, as there are attacks that can stay undetected by upper-layer security protocols.
Concretely, if an attacker manages to alter the sequence-number ﬁeld of iPRP packets
transmitted over one (compromised) network subcloud, the discard algorithm can be
tricked in a way that the packets from both (compromised and non-compromised)
network subclouds are discarded. Note that similar attacks exist for PRP, where an
attacker, with access to one network, can force the discard of valid frames on another
network. For example, say an attacker has access to network subcloud A. A PRP
frame is represented as A5, where A is the network subcloud it belongs to and 5 is
the sequence number. If A5 and B5 were received and the attacker retransmits the
frame A5 by altering the sequence number as A6, then the actual A6 and B6 frames
will both be discarded. In other words, an unsecured PRP or iPRP could weaken the
network instead of making it more robust. Yet another argument for protecting the
iPRP protocol is that by doing so we minimize the exposure for prospective attacks in
the future.
The iPRP control messages are encrypted and authenticated. This guarantees that
the security of replicated UDP ﬂows is not compromised by iPRP and that it does not
interfere with application layer encryption/authentication.
Speciﬁcally,   messages and the corresponding   messages are
transmitted over a secure channel. The iPRP header inserted in the data packets is
authenticated and encrypted with a pre-shared key. Thus, replay attacks and forged
messages insertion are avoided.
We establish the secure channel for the transmission of   messages de-
pending on the type of communication, unicast or multicast. Details follow below.
Unicast: In unicast mode, a DTLS (datagram transport layer security) [65] session is
maintained between the sender and the receiver. It is initiated by the receiver upon the
arrival of the ﬁrst UDP datagram from the source.   messages are transmitted
within this session. So, the iPRP capabilities of the receiver are transmitted only to an
authenticated source.  s are not required in unicast (since message implosion
can occur in multicast only).
Unicast   messages contain a symmetric key used to authenticate and
encrypt the iPRP header. This key is updated periodically during a unicast iPRP session.
Hosts keep a small ﬁxed number of valid past keys to prevent losing the iPRP session
because of delayed receiption of a new key. The oldest key is discarded upon reception
of a new one.
68
5.7. iPRP Diagnostic Toolkit
Multicast: In multicast, iPRP relies on any primitive that establishes a secure
channel with the multicast group. For example MSEC (multicast security) [66] can be
used for group key management and for establishing a group security association.
In this setting, both   and   messages, as well as the iPRP headers
inserted in the replicated packets, are authenticated and encrypted with the group key.
Thus, there is no need to include an additional key in the   .
5.7 iPRP Diagnostic Toolkit
As iPRP is designed to be IP friendly, it facilitates the exploitation of the diagnostic
utilities associated with TCP/IP. The diagnostics include veriﬁcation of connectivity
between hosts and the evaluation of the corresponding RTTs (similar to  	
), the
discovery of routes to a host (similar to ), etc. Furthermore, the toolkit also
adds some more tools that are speciﬁc to iPRP and it gives iPRP a signiﬁcant edge
in network diagnostics and statistics collection over PRP. The toolkit comprises the
following tools:
     
      
  	
   
    
 	  
    .
Imagine a typical scenario where an application on an iPRP-enabled host that
is subscribed to a particular multicast group (G) experiences packet losses. To trou-
bleshoot this problem, the user at the receiving host would use the   
tools to consult the local list of active senders, to check for the presence of an iPRP
session associated with any host sending multicast data to group G. If an iPRP session
exists, then the tool returns the statistics of packets received over different networks in
the iPRP session. Then, to understand if the problem is caused by multicast routing or
lossy links, the user moves to the sending host.
First, with   and by using the remote IP address of the receiver, the user
establishes a temporary, unicast iPRP session with the host. If successful, the   	

tool is used to obtain the packet loss and RTT statistics over the multiple networks.
Also, the   tool is used to verify the hop-by-hop UDP data delivery over
multiple networks. For any iPRP session between two hosts, the  	 is
used by the sending host to query the remote host about the statistics of the packets
accepted and dropped by the duplicate discard functional block on that remote host.
The operation of each tool is described in detail in [62].
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5.8 Implementation
We opted for a Linux-based user-space implementation that has the following prop-
erties: (1) Enable the selective ﬁltering of IP packets so that the iPRP sequence of
operation can be applied; (2) allow for packet mangling where the iPRP header can be
inserted and packets can be replicated at the sender and duplicates can be discarded
and original packet can be restored at the receiver; and (3) minimal CPU overhead.
To this end, we use the   	
 (NF_QUEUE) framework from the
Linux iptables project. NF_QUEUE is a userspace library that provides a handle to
packets queued by the kernel packet ﬁlter. It requires the    library and a
kernel that includes the  	
 subsystem (kernel 2.6.14 or later). It supports
all Linux kernel versions above 2.6.14. We use the the Linux kernel 3.11 with iptables-
1.4.12.
The main challenge encountered in the implementation was to ensure that the
delay and processing overhead was low. For this purpose, we categorized the various
instructions in iPRP as time-critical or non time-critical. For instance, adding the
iPRP header to a packet is time-critical, whereas updating the peer-base to enable
replication on a new network is non time-critical. Then, we used batching of non
time-critical instructions to reduce the total number of system-calls. In this way, we
achieved a lower-overhead while maintaining the same real-time performance.
Currently, we are deploying iPRP on our EPFL smart-grid communication network
(smartgrid.epﬂ.ch).
5.9 Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of our implementation, we have set up a lab
test-bed and do two types of assessment. The ﬁrst one is to evaluate the operation
of iPRP and its discard algorithm in different scenarios. The latter set of experiments
is to assess the processing delay due to iPRP and the additional CPU usage used by
iPRP software of our proof-of-concept implementation. Our test bed consists of two
Lenovo ThinkPad T400 laptops with a 64-bit Ubuntu OS. The laptops (Table 5.1) are
connected over two Ethernet based wired networks (one via USB adapter) and one
ad-hoc Wi-Fi network. We label the interface eth0 as nwA, eth1 as nwB and wlan0 as
nwC. To evaluate the real-time operation, we patched the Linux kernel 3.11.6 with the




CPU Intel C2Duo, 2.53 Ghz
Ethernet Controller Intel 82567LM Gigabit Card
Wireless Controller Intel Wiﬁ N d5300
Operating System Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, 64-bit
Kernel 3.6.11-rt29 (RT-Linux Patch)
Table 5.1: Speciﬁcations of hosts used in the test bed
5.9.1 iPRPBehavior in thePresenceofAsymmetricDelays andPacket Losses
Our goal here is to validate the design and implementation of iPRP by quantifying
the packet losses and delays perceived by an application. We stress-test the discard
algorithm with heavy losses and asymmetric delays and compare the performance with
that in theory. The packet losses and delays are emulated using the Linux    [67]
tool on the test bed described in Table 5.1.
In Table 5.2 we summarize settings used in different scenarios. To mimic the trafﬁc
created by PMUs, we send a 280 byte UDP datagram every 20ms, long enough to
have stationary behavior. We emulate delays that are uniformly distributed within
10ms±5ms (small differences in network topologies and/or loads), and within 1s±0.2s
(signiﬁcant differences in network topologies or serious perturbations in network
functioning). We emulate both independent and bursty losses. In both cases the
overall packets loss rate is 5%. To produce bursty losses with    we use the
Gilbert-Elliot model [68] with p = 0.01, r = 0.19, 1− k = 0.01, 1− h = 0.81.
Scenario
   delay : loss nature
nwA nwB nwC
0 S:IL S:IL S:IL
1 Z:IL S:IL not used
2 Z:BL S:BL not used
3 Z:IL L:IL not used
4 Z:BL L:BL not used
5 S:IL S:IL not used
Table 5.2: Scenarios used for performance evaluation.    added delay : “Z”
means 0 , “S” means small uniform 10ms± 5ms, and “L” means large uniform 1s± 0.2s.
Loss nature: “IL” means 5% independent and “BL” means 5% bursty losses.
We use Scenario 0 to evaluate the operation of iPRP in the presence of more than
two networks. In Scenarios 1-4, we test the discard algorithm by making asymmet-
ric delays and losses, thus forcing it to keep track of delayed/missing packets. With
Scenario 5, we test the expected iPRP side-beneﬁt of having lower average one-way
network latency, given that the iPRP duplicate-discard functional block always for-
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wards the ﬁrst packet delivered over any of the available networks. We measure delays
and losses over individual networks and as experienced by an application located on
top of iPRP.
In Table 5.3, we show the measurement results. We assume that the losses on
different networks are independent. Under this assumption, the expected actual loss
percentage can be approximated with the product of observed loss percentages on
different networks. We compare the observed actual losses (iPRP column) with the
expected actual loss percentage (theory column). A deviation would mean anomalies
in the iPRP protocol and implementation. The accordance between the last two
columns in Table 5.3 shows that iPRP performs as expected in signiﬁcantly reducing
the actual packet losses.
Scen. nwA nwB nwC iPRP theory
0 5.061 4.913 5.1537 0.0126 0.0128
1 5.057 5.002 not used 0.253 0.254
2 5.132 5.059 not used 0.259 0.254
3 5.014 5.013 not used 0.251 0.249
4 5.022 4.981 not used 0.247 0.249
5 5.051 5.002 not used 0.251 0.253
Table 5.3: Loss percentages in various scenarios
In Fig. 5.5 we show the CDF of one-way network latency for a speciﬁc packet (diPRP )
for Scenario 5. In theory, it should be diPRP = min(dnwA, dnwB), where dnwA, dnwB are
the one-way network latencies of the same packet on network sub-clouds A and
B. What we measured matches the theory very well. This is a conﬁrmation of the
anticipated side-beneﬁt of iPRP: the delays perceived by the application are improved
when iPRP is used, compared to those when only one of the individual networks is
used.
CDFs are not shown for Scenarios 1-4 as, by construction, it is almost deterministic
which network has the shortest latency. For example, in Scenario 1 most of the times
diPRP = min(dnwA, dnwB) = dnwA.
5.9.2 Processing Overhead Caused by iPRP
In this subsection, we evaluate processing delays and the additional CPU load when
iPRP is used on the test bed described in Table 5.1. We conduct several runs of Scenario
1 (see Table 5.2) and useGNUgprof [69] to assess the average processing delay incurred
by an iPRP data packet at the iPRP sender daemon (ISD) and the iPRP receiver daemon
(IRD). In an ISD, a data packet encoutners only the replicator function which adds the
iPRP header and replicates packets over multiple interfaces. This operation takes 0.8
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nwA: 10ms ± 5ms
nwB: 10ms ± 5ms
Figure 5.5: An iPRP side beneﬁt: the delays perceived by the application are improved
when iPRP is used, compared to those when only one of the individual networks is
used.
μs on average. In an IRD, a data packet encounters three functions. The packet handler
copies a packet into user-space, veriﬁes the ﬁelds of the iPRP header and prepares a
packet for the duplicate discard function which indicates if a packet is to be dropped
or forwarded. These operations take 0.8 μs and 0.4 μs on average respectively. Lastly, if
a packet is to be forwarded, the iPRP header is removed and checksum is recomputed
in 2.4 μs. On average, a data packet incurs a delay overhead of 4.4 μs due to iPRP.
In order to assess the additional CPU load when iPRP is used, we perform two
experiments in which we record the CPU usage by iPRP daemons on the sender and
on the receiver. The results are summarized in Table 5.4. In Experiment 1 we keep
constant aggregate packet rate of 1000 packets per second (pps) for all established
iPRP sessions (1 iPRP session of 1000 pps, 2 iPRP sessions of 500 pps each, etc.). The
CPU usage with iPRP is quasi-constant at 15 % for the sender and 12 % for the receiver.
In Experiment 2 we keep a constant packet rate of 10 pps for every individual iPRP
session (1 iPRP session - 10 pps in total, 2 iPRP sessions - 20 pps in total, etc.). At the
sender, the CPU usage increases, at ﬁrst, at a rate of 0.9 % per iPRP session and the
increase rate per iPRP session decreases to 0.32 % for larger number of iPRP sessions.
At the receiver, the increase rate of CPU usage per each additional iPRP session goes
from 0.8 % to 0.22 %.
Following the results from Table 5.4, the additional % of CPU usage at sender (Us)
and receiver (Ur) due to iPRP can be approximated by the relations:
Us = 3.7 + 0.28× (# of iPRP sessions) + 0.01× (packets/s)
Ur = 0.9 + 0.08× (# of iPRP sessions) + 0.01× (packets/s)
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Number
Exper. 1: Aggregate Exper. 2: pps
of
of pps for all iPRP sessions per iPRP session kept
kept constant to 1000 constant to 10
sessions Send. [%] Rec. [%] Send. [%] Rec. [%]
0 (Idle) 3.7 0.9 3.7 0.9
1 14.5 11.8 4.5 2.2
2 14.1 11.9 5.6 2.4
4 15 11.3 5.7 2.3
10 15 12 7.3 3.2
20 15 12 10 5.2
Table 5.4: CPU usage with iPRP and varying loads
5.10 Conclusion
We have designed iPRP, a transport layer solution for improving reliability of UDP
ﬂows with hard-delay constraints, such as smart grid communication, industrial pro-
cesses, high-frequency trading and online gaming. iPRP is application- and network-
transparent, which makes it plug-and-play with existing applications and network
infrastructure. Furthermore, our soft-state design makes it resilient to software crashes.
Besides unicast, iPRP supports IP multicast, making it a suitable solution for low-
latency industrial automation applications requiring reliable data delivery. We have
equipped iPRP with diverse monitoring and debugging tools (iPRP diagnostic toolkit






quasi impossible with existing MAC layer solutions. With our implementation, we have
shown that iPRP can support several sessions between hosts without any signiﬁcant
delay or processing overhead. To achieve a low delay and processing-overhead, we use
batching of non time-critical instructions thereby reducing the total number of system
calls.
Interworking with legacy systems could be handled by developing adequate proxies.
Legacy hosts that cannot be upgraded with iPRP software could be placed behind an
iPRP proxy that would handle all iPRP functions and could thus communicate with an
iPRP-enabled host. This would add redundancy to the path between the iPRP proxy
and the other end of communication. Nevertheless, the iPRP proxy would now be a
single-point-of-failure. A very interesting case arises if the legacy host is equipped with
PRP. In such cases, the solution with an iPRP proxy still applies but could be improved
using the concept of split proxies in order to remove the single-point-of-failure. Split
proxies would each be singly-attached to the PRP LAN and to the IP network. They
would insert the iPRP header to each duplicate packet received from the PRP LANs.
The challenge, left for future work, is to design a distributed algorithm between the
split proxies in order to ensure consistency of iPRP sequence numbers.
Our implementation is publicly available and is currently being installed in our
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campus smart-grid [3]. In the future, we intend to do extensive measurements on our
smart-grid and study the performance of iPRP in real networks.
To further reduce the delay-overhead due to iPRP, one might think of a more ef-
ﬁcient kernel-space implementation. However, given the low delay-overhead of our
user-space implementation, it fully satisﬁes the needs of proof-of-concept implementa-
tion. Another possible approach is to push the implementation of iPRP functionalities
to the network adapter itself, similarly to the TCP segmentation ofﬂoad technique [70].
Also, given the slow adoption of IPv6, porting the implementation to IPv4 can be of
interest for the future work.
Appendix
5.A Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the statement of Theorem 1, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. IfR×Δ < 231 andR×(Tinactivity+Δ) < 231, then the wrap-around problem
does not exist.
Proof. The wrap-around problem can arise in two scenarios.
Case 1: A late packet arrives with   < 	− 231. As R×Δ < 231, the time
required by the source to emit 231 packets is longer than Δ. Hence, 	 cannot
precede   for more than 231 and this scenario is not possible.
Case 2: A fresh packet is received with   > 	 + 231. This means that
from the point of view of the receiver, there were more than 231 iPRP packets lost in
succession. AsR×(Tinactivity+Δ) < 231, the time for more than 231 consecutive packets
to be sent is greater than (Tinactivity +Δ). Hence, the time between reception of any
two packets differing by s more than 231 is greater than (Tinactivity). Therefore, during
this time the iPRP session would be terminated and a new session will be initiated
when the fresh packet is received. Hence, this scenario is also not possible.
Therefore, in the rest of the proof, we can ignore the wrap-around problem and do
as if s of received packets were integers of inﬁnite precision. Also, a notation such as
	t− [resp. 	t+] denotes the value of 	 just before [resp. after] time t.
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity of HighSN). If at time t, a packet with  = α is received, then
	t+ = max(	t− , α). Therefore, 	 increases monotonically with time.
Proof. From Alg. 6, when α > 	t− (line 4) then the value of 	 is changed
to α (line 7). Otherwise, when 	t− ≥ α (lines 2 and 9), 	 is unchanged, i.e.,
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 t+ =  t− . The two cases combined together give  t+ = max( t− , α).
Lemma 3 (Fresh packet is never put in 	). If at time t, a packet with  = α is
forwarded to the application then α /∈ 	t′+∀ t′ ≥ t.
Proof. Let us prove by contradiction. Assume that ∃ t′ > t such that α ∈ 	t′ .
Hence, ∃ t1 ∈ (t, t′]when αwas added to 	. As t1 > t, from Lemma 2, we conclude
that  t1− ≥  t+ ≥ α. Now, from Alg. 6, we know that only SNs >  t1−
can be added to 	. Hence, α cannot be added to 	 at time t1. Therefore, we
have a contradiction.
Lemma 4. At any time t,  t− is equal to  of a packet received at some time t0 < t
or no packet has been received yet.
Proof.   is modiﬁed only at line 7, where it takes the value of the SN received.
Hence,   cannot have a value of a SN that has not been seen yet.
Now, we proceed with the proof of the theorem. First, we prove statement (1).
Assume we receive a duplicate packet with  = α at time t. It means that a packet
with  = α was already seen at time t0 < t. Then, from Lemma 2 it follows that
α ≤  t− . Then, either α =  t− (line 2) or α <  t− (line 10).
Case 1: When α =  t− , the packet is discarded according to line 3.
Case 2: When α <  t− , line 10 is evaluated as false due to Lemma 3. Hence,
the packet is discarded by line 14.
Next, we prove statement (2) by contradiction. Assume we receive a ﬁrst copy of a
valid packet with  = α at time t but we do not forward it. This can happen either due
to line 3 (case 1) or due to line 14 (case 2).
Case 1: Statement from line 2 was evaluated as true, which means that α =
 t− . As  = α is seen for the ﬁrst time, Lemma 4 is contradicted. Hence, this
case is not possible.
Case 2: Statement from line 10 was evaluated as false, which means that α <
 t− and α /∈ 	t− . We show by contradiction that this is not possible, i.e., we
now assume that α <  t− and α /∈ 	t− . Now, there are three cases when
α /∈ 	t− can be true:
(i)  = α was added to and removed from 	 before time t because it was seen
(line 11) which is impossible as the packet is fresh.
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(ii)   = α was added to   and later removed at time t0 < t because the size
of   is limited to 	
 entries (line 6). This means that at time t0 < t a packet
with   = β was forwarded and β − α > 	
 (line 6). However, this means that the
packet with   = α was not valid at time t0 and therefore is also not valid at time t > t0.
(iii)   = αwas never added to  . Consider the setT = {τ ≥ 0 :  τ+ > α}.
T is non-empty because t ∈ T, by hypothesis of our contradiction. Let t0 = inf T. Then,
necessarily  t0− ≤ α <  t0+ (say, = β). β is the   of a packet received at
time t0. Since α is valid, β − α < 	
. Otherwise, α would be invalid at time t0,
therefore at time t, which is excluded. Then we have two subcases possible:
a)  t0− < α. Then, by line 5, α is added to  , which is a contradiction.
b)  t0− = α. But, by Lemma 4 a packet with   = α must have been received
before t0 which is a contradiction because α is a fresh packet at t ≥ t0.
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Some of the industrial processes with hard real-time constraints require the creation
of redundant multicast-distribution trees to support 0-ms packet repair-time. For
example, in the emerging smart-grids there are applications such as grid protection
or grid control that are considered critical. We were faced with such requirements
when we designed the communication network as part of the EPFL smart-grid project
(smartgrid.epﬂ.ch).
Solutions such as PRP [20] and iPRP [71] have been deployed in these settings;
they achieve 0-ms packet repair-time by duplicating packets over node-redundant
multicast-distribution trees. This is commonly done in industry by having dedicated
and duplicated networks. In this chapter, we study how to construct node-redundant
multicast trees that can be used in parallel over a shared network infrastructure. This
is of interest to telecom operators and manufacturers who want to propose solutions
over their shared infrastructures [61].
Our work differs from [34] and [72], as the solutions in [34] and [72] establish one
multicast tree as a backup tree that is activated only when a link or node failure is
detected in the primary tree. This require extra repair-time delay as the detection of a
failure is a time consuming process. Our solution however relies on the parallel use of
node-redundant trees, hence it provides a 0-ms packet repair-time.
The approach that we undertook is applicable to any mechanisms for network
control that have global information about the state of the communication network.
The working assumption is such that there exists a centralized or distributed controller
79
Chapter 6. Performance Comparison of Node-Redundant Multicast-Distribution
Trees
that can impose routing rules to all the nodes that are part of the network.
In this paper, we focus our study on SDN-based networks because we believe that
this is the technology that is very compatible with the assumption and that would
be deployed in practice in this case by most network managers. SDN technology is
the most likely candidate for the design of 5G systems [73, 74] as it provides a fully
programmable operator-network interface. An SDN controller has global information
of the situation in the network and can enforce appropriate forwarding rules to the
SDN switches. This should therefore facilitate the implementation of the proposed
algorithms. Nevertheless, there is a question of the choice of the appropriate algorithm
to be implemented for the purpose of creating node-redundant multicast-distribution
trees.
This problem is proven to be NP-complete [75] and approximation methods for
solving it are the only possible. To that end, we evaluate the performance of three
algorithms that we adapted to the smart-grid setting: (i)  	
 [76] computes
a pair of node-redundant spanning trees for a source, (ii)  [77] computes a
pair of maximally disjoint paths between a source and each of its destinations, and
(iii)   	 [75] ﬁnds a pair of minimum-cost Steiner trees between a
source and all its destinations. Adaptations of the ﬁrst two algorithms provide us with
a pair of node-redundant multicast trees, whereas the third one constructs a pair of
node-disjoint multicast trees.
We analyze the following metrics: network-utilization efﬁciency (number of sources
placed, minimum/maximum number of hops to the destination) and the number of
forwarding rules that need to be installed at SDN switches, with and without aggre-
gation. We quantify performance of different methods based on these metrics when
applied on networks with structured (operator) topology or on random networks. Our
results show the following:
• In terms of the numbers of sources placed, for general networks,  	
1
and  perform the best as in some cases, especially for random topologies
with an increasing number of destinations, 	 is unable to
place the second tree for any sources, hence it is not a viable solution. Neverthe-
less, for structured, dual-plane-like networks, 	 gives results
comparable to the two other algorithms.
• In terms of the number of hops to the destinations,  and 	
(if source placement is possible) outperform  	
 as they construct
paths that are 2 to 3 times shorter than those established by  	
. They
can therefore provide a much better delay guarantee.
1We call “ 	
" the adaptation of  	
 and similarly with  and
	.
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• Using   and 	
		 			 (if source placement is possible), the
total number of rules that need to be installed in the network is 5 to 6 times
smaller than  when no ﬂow-rule aggregation is applied. If applied,
the number of installed rules is reduced to handful of rules for all the algorithms.
• In terms of the SDN-control-plane activity in the case of change in network
topology (node failure or new source),   and 	
		 			 require
fewer changes compared to . If the change of interest is an arrival
or departure of a destination within a multicast group,  requires no
changes, hence it outperforms the two other algorithms in this case.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we cover the
related work. In Section 6.3, we provide the problem formulation. In Section 6.4, we
introduce three different types of algorithms that we study here, to construct node-
redundant multicast trees. In Section 6.5, we analyze their performance and in Section
6.6 we discuss the effects of topology changes on the SDN control-plane activity. In
Section 6.7, we provide the conclusion.
6.2 State of the Art
An extensive overview of the algorithms for network survivability was done by Kuipers
in [78]; it served as an excellent reference in classifying methods for the creation of
multicast-distribution trees.
We distinguish three different families of algorithms that are of our interest and we
choose for this evaluation one representative from each of the families. First, there
are algorithms that ﬁnd spanning trees. In the literature, we ﬁnd many solutions that
are based on placing one tree and then removing links and nodes already used, before
placing the second trees. Such solutions are suboptimal and can lead to the inability
to place the second tree. A better solution is presented by Médard et al. in [79] and we
choose its extension (algorithm ) by Zhang et al. [76] as the representative
of the algorithms that ﬁnd node-redundant spanning trees.
The second family of algorithms ﬁnd Steiner trees. As for the spanning trees, there
are many solutions based on placing one Steiner tree and then removing links and
nodes already used, before placing the second one. Surprisingly, to the best of our
knowledge, there are no practical algorithms for concurrent tree-construction. We
leave this problem for future work and for this comparison we use the method of
sequential placing of Steiner trees constructed with the algorithm from [75]. We refer
to this algorithm as 	
		   			.
Finally, we have algorithms that ﬁnd disjoint paths, where many algorithms are
inspired by the work of Suurballe and Tarjan [80]. We single out the work of Nina
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Taft-Plotkin et al. [77] (MADSWIP algorithm) and Guo et al. [81] (DIMCRA algorithm).
MADSWIP computes maximum-bandwidth maximally disjoint paths and minimizes
the total weight as the secondary objective, whereas DIMCRA ﬁnds two link-disjoint
paths subject to multiple quality-of-service constraints. In our smart-grid setting,
metrics of interest are only bandwidth and delay, hence, for the comparison, we
choose MADSWIP as the representative of the algorithms that ﬁnd disjoint paths.
The application of SDN technology for reliable smart-grid communication net-
works is considered in [34] and [72]. Neverthless, despite insisting on the need for
reliable packet delivery, the described settings are not compatible with a reliability
brought by iPRP-like 0ms repair-time. In [34], the authors describe  , an algo-
rithm that uses OpenFlow to detect link failures that should trigger the activation of
backup multicast-distribution trees. However, the time-scale in which   operates
is in the order of seconds, which is unacceptable for critical processes in smart grids.
Similarly, in [72], the approach of bypassing the link that has failed after the failure
occurs with the precomputed backup segment is not acceptable for critical trafﬁc.
The parallel redundancy protocol (PRP) [20] requires redundant, and, moreover,
cloned networks; hence it cannot be used in a shared infrastructure. TCP-like solutions
are acceptable for applications with less strict delay-requirements, as it takes several
round-trip times for losses to be repaired. Network coding [82] is commonly used
to improve network’s throughput and reliability but can perform poorly in terms of
latency. Source coding (e.g., Fountain codes [59]) is suitable in the case of bursty packet
transmissions where encoding and decoding are performed across several packets.
However, in smart grids, usually there is a single packet per time-slot and it should be
sent as soon as it is available to avoid unnecessary delays.
6.3 Problem formulation
Let (V, E) be a directed graph representing our network, with the set of vertices V and
the set of edges E . Let B(i, j) be the bandwidth assigned to (i, j) ∈ E and C(i, j) be
the cost of using the link. We denote by M(s) = {s,D(s)} a multicast session with
source s ∈ V and destinations D(s) ⊆ V − s. We study algorithms to construct a pair of
node-redundant multicast trees for this session such that a failure of a node (vertex) in
the network leaves each destination in D(s) still connected to the source by using at
least one of the trees.
These node-redundant trees are not necessarily disjoint and can contain some
nodes or edges in common. Hence, our study is different from those that propose
the use of disjoint spanning trees; those studies are based on placing one tree and
then removing links and nodes already used, before placing the second tree, because
they are suboptimal and can lead to the inability to place the second tree [79]. For an
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example of one such case, we refer to Figure 6.1. Node 1 is the source of packets and
there are two destinations of interest: nodes 5 and 7. The blue tree follows the path
1-3-5-6-7, whereas the red tree follows the path 1-4-7-6-5. We observe that the two
trees share node 6 thus making them non-disjoint. Nevertheless, both destinations
can be reached upon a failure of a single node (node-redundancy property), which is
the goal we want to accomplish. Note that in this example it is not even possible to
construct two trees that are disjoint.
Figure 6.1: Source: Node 1. Destinations of interest: 5 and 7. Blue and red trees are
node-redundant but they are not disjoint (node 6 is shared).
For comparison, we deﬁne the following metrics of interest:
• Number of sources placed. This metric illustrates how many sources can be
served, depending on the approach taken. We say that a source is placed only if
it is possible to establish node-redundant trees that comprise all the destinations
in the group of receivers, subject to the capacity constraints.
• Minimum number of hops between each source and each destination. Given
that in all cases we have two paths between each source and each destination,
this metric illustrates the effective number of hops (delay) in the case when both
paths are operational.
• Maximum number of hops between each source and each destination. Given
that in all cases we have two paths between each source and each destination,
this metric illustrates the effective number of hops (delay) in the worst case if
one path becomes unavailable.
• Number of ﬂow rules installed per source placed. This metric illustrates how big
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the SDN ﬂow tables are. It is desirable to have a smaller number of ﬂow-table
entries as the switches can be of limited resources.
• Number of ﬂow rules installed per source placed. This metric illustrates how
many rules need to be installed at the switches by the controller and how large
the SDN ﬂow tables are. The larger the number of rules installed is, the higher the
volume of control trafﬁc exchanged is between the controller and switches. This
can, on one hand, overload the controller and, on the other hand, saturate the
control plane. A larger number of installed rules also means larger ﬂow tables,
which can affect the performance of SDN switches with limited resources.
6.4 Methods Used in this comparison and necessary adapta-
tions
As mentioned in Section 6.2, we choose  	
,   	 and
 as the basis for the methods based on spanning trees, Steiner trees, and dis-
joint paths, respectively. In order to compare these approaches, it was necessary
to harmonize the assumptions and to adapt the algorithms so that they all produce
multicast-distribution trees. We discuss below the necessary adaptations, after de-
scribing the algorithms themselves.
6.4.1  	

This algorithm ﬁnds a pair of directed node-redundant spanning trees (referring to
as TR and TB trees) for a given source in the network. As stated by Xue et al. [83], the
construction of these trees is related to ear decomposition of the graph. Adapting this
idea,  	
 constructs TR and TB from a DFS (depth ﬁrst search) tree T by
applying the ear decomposition technique. This is done by adding an ear whenever
a back edge from T to the current TR and TB , which span a subset of the network
nodes, is encountered. The resulting TR and TB trees have a total cost that is minimum
among all possible node-redundant spanning trees.
As mentioned in Section 6.3, we analyze directed graphs.  	
 takes as
input undirected graphs, whereas it outputs directed graphs. This means that, after
placing the ﬁrst source and updating the available link capacities, the resulting graph
has available link capacities that are asymmetric. Hence, it cannot be treated as
undirected, which is the problem for the next iteration of the simulation when the next
source needs to be placed. For a solution, for every link, we keep track of the available
capacities in both directions; and for the input for the algorithm, we take the minimum
of the two.
Furthermore, for each source that offers trafﬁc  	
 computes a pair of
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spanning trees that already have a property of having no single point of failure. By
construction, all the destinations from a group of receivers that belong to the same
multicast group will be reachable, hence no further adaptation is required. We sort the
sources based on the offered trafﬁc and we treat them in that order. Before placing a
source, we remove the links that do not have enough capacity to support the offered
trafﬁc.
6.4.2    	

[75] proposes a heuristic to compute minimum-cost Steiner tree for a given source
node and a set of destinations in a network. This heuristic performs as follows. It
ﬁrst ﬁnds the closest destination to the source and constructs the path between the
source and the destination. It then selects the closest non-spanned destination to this
tree and updates the tree by adding the path between this destination and the tree. It
repeats this process until all the destination nodes are covered. The resulting Steiner
tree has the minimum total cost.
   	
 also expects the input in the form of undirected graphs,
whereas it outputs directed graphs. We deal with this aspect in the same way as in
the case of the method based on spanning trees (see the description of 
	
approach).
An additional adaptation is needed as    	
 provides a single
Steiner tree (not a pair). Hence, we use the method (e.g., described in [84]) where after
placing the ﬁrst Steiner tree, we remove the already used nodes and links. After this we
run again the    	
 algorithm for the creation of the second Steiner
tree, that is now node-redundant by construction. We sort the sources based on the
offered trafﬁc and that is the order in which we treat them. Before placing a source, we
remove the links without enough capacity to support the offered trafﬁc.
6.4.3 
This algorithm computes a pair of maximally disjoint paths between the source and its
destinations such that either the total cost of paths is minimized or the bandwidth is
maximized. It performs as follows. First, a shortest-path tree from the source to the
destination is computed.The edge costs and bandwidths are updated, based on the
computed shortest path, and the nodes are labeled. Using this labelling information, a
pair of disjoint paths from the source to all destinations is computed.
In the case of , both input and output graphs are directed. Hence, in this
respect, no changes are needed. Still, there is another adaptation that is required. Our
goal is to ﬁnd node-redundant multicast trees, whereas  produces link-disjoint
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paths. Therefore, we needed ﬁrstly to adapt the   to produce node-disjoint
paths (instead of link-disjoint) before combining them into node-redundant multicast
trees. The method that we used is described in [78]; we split each node u into two
nodes u1 and u2, with a directed link (u1, u2), and the incoming links of u connected to
u1 and the outgoing links of u departing from u2.
Once we have node-disjoint paths, there is a question of how to combine them into
node-redundant trees. Each source has a number of destinations that correspond to
the same multicast group. Each execution of [77] produces a pair of paths originating
from the source, one pair per destination. This raises the question of how to combine
disjoint paths into trees: For a single path-pair, which path should join which of the
two output trees? We use the following heuristic to solve this problem. Again, we sort
the sources based on the offered trafﬁc and that is the order in which we treat them.
For each source, we pick randomly the ﬁrst destination (from the group of multicast
receivers) and we compute disjoint paths. The two solution trees (named blue and
red) are initialized with these paths. After every subsequent computation of disjoint
paths (for the other destinations from the same multicast group), we decide which
path should be combined with which tree, based on the minimal number of new links
that need to be added. We also remove the links without enough capacity to support
the offered trafﬁc for the next computation.
Furthermore, to have a fair comparison, we accept paths from   only if they
are completely disjoint (  ﬁnds maximally disjoint paths). For the same reason,
we implemented a version of   that computes minimum-cost disjoint paths
(instead of maximum bandwidth).
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we provide performance analysis. We ﬁrst describe our simulation
setting.
6.5.1 Network scenarios
Random (ad-hoc) topology: We generate a topology that resembles topologies of
wireless sensor networks (see Figure 6.2). We place 100 switches in a 1000m× 1000m
area as follows: The positions are generated uniformly at random, with restrictions
that no switches are within 75m, and the connectivity between switches is ensured if
the distance between them is below 150m. All the links have capacity of 1.
We randomly select a subset of nodes that serve as destinations. Depending on the
number of destinations, we distinguish scenarios that correspond to sparse multicast
(3, 4, ... , 10 receivers) and dense multicast (15, 20, 25, ... , 40 receivers). In the sparse
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multicast case, we select destinations in such a way that the distance between any
pair of destinations is at least 100m. The idea is that several receivers are required for
reliability reasons and thus they should not be too close to each other.All the nodes that
are not designated as receivers are the candidate sources with the trafﬁc rate uniformly
distributed in the interval [0.025, 0.05]. Our algorithms try to compute node-redundant
trees for as many of them as possible.
Figure 6.2: Random (ad-hoc) topology.
Structured (operator) topology: We also study the performance of mechanisms
proposed in the previous section on a topology generated from [85,86]; it represents
the backhaul of carrier networks. It is hierarchical and consists of three layers: access,
aggregation, and core.
The access layer consists of clusters of 20 access switches, each connected to
two neighboring aggregation switches (to provide redundancy between access and
aggregation layers). The aggregation layer consists of 4 pods, each with 4 switches
connected together in a full mesh.
Two of the switches in a pod are connected to each of 20 access switches in a cluster
and the remaining two switches are connected to two core switches. The core layer
consists of 4 switches connected together in a full mesh. We therefore have a network
of size 100 with 80 access switches, 16 aggregation switches and 4 core switches.
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The links between access switches and aggregation switches have a capacity of 1.
The links between aggregation switches (within a pod) have a capacity of 20. The links
between aggregation switches and core switches have a capacity of 40. The resulting
network is depicted in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: Structured (infrastructure) topology.
We randomly select subset of nodes that serve as destinations from the group
of access nodes. As for the random topology case, depending on the number of
destinations, we distinguish scenarios that correspond to sparse multicast (3, 4, ... ,
10 receivers) and dense multicast (15, 20, 25, ... , 40 receivers). All the nodes from the
group of access nodes that are not designated as receivers are the candidate sources
with the trafﬁc rate uniformly distributed in the interval [0.025, 0.05]. Our algorithms
try to compute node-redundant trees for as many of them as possible.
6.5.2 Results
The results presented here are the output of 20 simulations with different seeds. Hence,
every simulation has a different group of sources/destinations and different offered
trafﬁc for the sources. We show the average values and the conﬁdence interval for
the number of sources placed and the number of installed rules (with and without
aggregation).
Random (ad-hoc) topology, sparse multicast:
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As shown in Figure 6.4, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the number of sources
that can be placed when the number of destinations is fewer than seven. Once the
number of destinations grows bigger,    	
 starts paying the price
of the fact that it is the only algorithm that does not construct trees in parallel. Conse-
quently, with more than seven destinations, after placing the ﬁrst of the two trees, it
becomes impossible to place the second tree for more than only a few sources. The
main bottleneck in how many sources can be placed for the other two algorithms is
the aggregated capacity of the links to the destination node with minimum degree,
among all destinations. For example, node 93 in the upper-right corner (Figure 6.2)
has only two edges that connect this node to the rest of the graph. Hence, the aggre-
gated capacity that is shared among two tree branches that reach this destination is
2. Therefore, we cannot place more than 21− 23 sources, as the aggregated trafﬁc of
this many sources in decreasing order of offered trafﬁc is close to 1. In the case of node
42 (lower-left corner) this capacity is 3. So, if the node 42 is the node with minimum
number of edges in the multicast group, the limiting capacity is 50% higher than in the
case of node 93, and more sources can be placed (∼ 35). The more destinations we
have the higher probability is that one of the nodes with two edges will be in the group
of receivers; and this is why we converge to 21− 23 sources placed.
Figure 6.4: Number of sources placed for random topology, sparse multicast.
When it comes to the minimum number of hops between sources and destinations
(CDFs depicted in Figures 6.5 and 6.6), 
	 is dominated by the other two.
This is expected, as 
	 does not have as a goal creation of short paths to
speciﬁc nodes; the goal is simply to cover all the nodes of a given graph.
Looking at the number of rules that need to be installed, both with and without rule
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Figure 6.5: Minimum number of hops for random topology, sparse multicast.
aggregation (Figures 6.7 and 6.8), we see that  	
 is the worst one; but the
difference is not so signiﬁcant if the aggregation is applied. We do not show results for
  	 for more than seven destinations as, afterward, the number
of sources placed becomes very low. For fewer destinations, we see that  
	 gives slightly better results than , as every additional destination
is added by minimizing the distance from the nearest node in an already established
tree to other destinations within the same multicast group. Whereas, in the case of
, every destination within a multicast group is treated completely separately.
Random (ad-hoc) topology, dense multicast:
The trends stay the same when we analyze dense multicast case. The number of
sources that can be placed stays stable for  	
 and , whereas the
decreasing trend for   	 continues, which means that no, or very
few, sources can be placed (Figure 6.9).
The conclusions are unchanged when it comes to the minimum number of hops
between sources and destinations (CDF shown in Figure 6.10),  is better than
 	
 and   	 is not shown because almost no sources
were placed. The same conclusions are valid for the maximum number of hops be-
tween sources and destinations (CDF shown in Figure 6.11). However,  loses
its dominance when it comes to the number of rules that need to be installed both
with and without rules aggregation (Figures 6.12 and 6.13). Simply, with the increasing
number of destinations, the number of affected nodes grows for  and, in the
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Figure 6.6: Maximum number of hops for random topology, sparse multicast.
case of  	
, all the nodes are affected no matter how many destinations
there are.
Structured topology, sparse multicast:
Before we analyze the results for the structured topology, we should make one
observation. This topology resembles dual-plane topologies and, given that the capac-
ities at the core and aggregation levels are sufﬁcient, the bottlenecks will simply be
the links that are connected to the destinations that are part of the multicast group.
All the algorithms are “smart enough" to discover two planes, even though they are
not explicitly deﬁned so the number of sources places is comparable in all cases, see
Figure 6.14. Again, we converge to 21 − 23 sources placed, as the aggregated trafﬁc
of that many sources (in decreasing order of offered trafﬁc) is close to 1, which is the
capacity of the links to the destinations mentioned above.
As for the rest of the results (Figures 6.15 - 6.18), for the number of hops, we see
again that  	
 is dominated by the two others that are comparable. The
same holds for the number of SDN rules that need to be installed, and again, the
difference is not so signiﬁcant with route aggregation.
Structured topology, dense multicast:
In this scenario, the bottlenecks are the same as for the sparse case: the links that
are connected to the destinations that are part of the multicast group. Consequently,
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Figure 6.7: Number of rules installed without aggregation for random topology, sparse
multicast.
all the conclusions are the same as for the sparse case, and the corresponding graphs
are depicted in Figures 6.19 - 6.23.
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Figure 6.8: Number of rules installed with aggregation for random topology, sparse
multicast.
Figure 6.9: Number of sources placed for random topology, dense multicast.
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Figure 6.10: Minimum number of hops for random topology, dense multicast.
Figure 6.11: Maximum number of hops for random topology, dense multicast.
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Figure 6.12: Number of rules installed without aggregation for random topology, dense
multicast.
Figure 6.13: Number of rules installed with aggregation for random topology, dense
multicast.
95
Chapter 6. Performance Comparison of Node-Redundant Multicast-Distribution
Trees
Figure 6.14: Number of sources placed for structured topology, sparse multicast.
Figure 6.15: Minimum number of hops for structured topology, sparse multicast.
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Figure 6.16: Maximum number of hops structured topology, sparse multicast.
Figure 6.17: Number of rules installed without aggregation for structured topology,
sparse multicast.
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Figure 6.18: Number of rules installed with aggregation for structured topology, sparse
multicast.
Figure 6.19: Number of sources placed for structured topology, dense multicast.
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Figure 6.20: Minimum number of hops for structured topology, dense multicast.
Figure 6.21: Maximum number of hops for structured topology, dense multicast.
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Figure 6.22: Number of rules installed without aggregation for structured topology,
dense multicast.
Figure 6.23: Number of rules installed with aggregation for structured topology, dense
multicast.
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6.6 Discussion about SDN-rules update-activity provoked by
topology changes
In this section, we analyze the effect of different changes in scenarios to the activity
of the SDN control plane. Concretely, we are interested in situations when there
is a permanent change in the system that triggers the update of already installed
forwarding rules. The goal of the reconstruction is the (re)establishment of node-
redundancy property for all the sources and destinations, without disrupting services
that are in-progress. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the SDN-control-plane activity in case
of (i) node failure, (ii) the arrival of a new destination within a multicast group, and
(iii) the arrival of a new source. This analysis is carried out under the assumption that,
after a change, it is still possible to construct node-redundant multicast-distribution
trees without disrupting the connections that are already put in place.
SDN-rules update-activity in the case of node failure Depending on the position
of the failed node, and on the algorithm in use, the effect of such an event can be
different. First, we analyze the case of random topology. For  	
, a node
failure certainly breaks both spanning trees that are constructed. As a consequence,
a new pair of spanning trees has to be computed. For   	 and
 the answer is less straightforward; it depends on the position of the failed
node. It can be part of none, or very few, of the already established trees, hence
its failure will not affect signiﬁcantly the network operation. Therefore,  
	 and  are less vulnerable to node failures, compared to  	
.
In order to compare them in more details, we made a simulation analysis to evaluate
the probability that a placed pair of trees is affected in case of a random node failure.
We did it for cases with 3 and 6 destinations within a multicast group, for the random
topology. For both 3 and 6 destinations, the difference in probabilities for these two
algorithms is negligible (around 1%). Speciﬁcally, we get 25% and 36%, for 3 and 6
destinations respectively.
For the structured topology, failure of an access switch means permanent discon-
nection for the directly connected source or destination. Failure of an aggregation
switch disables one of the trees but the redundancy re-establishment is impossible.
This is as we set the level of connectivity between access and aggregation switches to 2
and also because the pods are of size 4, hence, any lower layer aggregation switches is
only connected to two upper layer aggregation switches. Therefore, the failure of inter-
est is a failure of one of the core nodes as, in this case, the redundancy re-establishment
is possible. Given the topology, almost all of the established trees will be affected and
new computations will be needed for all the algorithms.
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SDN-rules update-activity in the case of an arrival of a new destination within a
multicast group Here we assume that we add a new receiver in the group of multicast
receivers. This does not affect  	
 as all the nodes are reachable from all
the existing sources and spanning trees are constructed and rules are already put in
place. For   	 and , new calculations will be needed and,
as we see from the ﬁgures that show the CDFs of the number of hops, the effect is
similar as up to 20 nodes will be affected in majority of cases, irrespectively of scenario.
To conclude, contrary to the previous case,  	
 outpeforms the two other
algorithms.
SDN-rules update-activity in the case of an arrival of a new source Here we assume
that a new source starts sending trafﬁc to already present group of receivers. For all the
algorithms, a new computation of tree pairs is needed. In the case of  	
, an
installation of new rules will be needed in all the nodes. For   	
and , the fraction of the nodes that require new rules depends on the exact
scenario. As fewer nodes are affected because we are not creating spanning trees,
the conclusion is similar to the one in the ﬁrst scenario:   	 and
 are less affected by source arrivals, compared to  	
, and are very
close to each other. Concretely, the ﬁgures that show the number of rules installed
(with and without aggregation) per source placed are the best comparison of the effect
of the arrival of a new source, depending on the used algorithm.
6.7 Conclusion
In summary, we can say that  is the overall winner in this performance compar-
ison. It is robust and it performs the best or comparably well to the best algorithm in a
wide range of scenarios and metrics. However, there are two exceptions where it makes
sense to consider other algorithms. First, if the topology of interest is truly dual-plane
and if it is guaranteed that it will remain so, no matter what the changes in the network
are, we might consider applying   	 as, under such conditions, its
performance is comparable to (or even slightly better than) the one of . Second,
if the rate of arrivals/departures of new destinations within a multicast group is high,
which provokes high SDN-control-plane activity, we should consider  	
 as
a solution. This, of course, if the higher number of hops between source-destination
pairs can be tolerated (this translates to less-strict delay requirements).
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ronment
7.1 Introduction and Motivation
Mission-critical computer applications with very hard-delay constraints were the main
focus of the work presented so far in this thesis. In Chapter 5 we presented iPRP - our
solution to exploit redundant network-infrastructure with a goal of timely delivery of
messages expected by previously mentioned applications. iPRP is a transport-layer
solution and, as such, it depends on the proper operation of the network layer, i.e.,
on each of the redundant networks that are used. Needless to say, in order to reach
the stable network operation for mission-critical applications, the natural choice is
to design a wired-based network infrastructure. However, not all applications used in
smart grids (and in other ﬁelds) are mission-critical. Hence, this raises the question
of what is the effect of iPRP in a wireless environment: Would an application perceive
fewer losses, if iPRP is used? In other words, we want to quantify the improvement in
terms of packet losses brought by iPRP in a wireless environment. An important beneﬁt
of such an improvement is that, for some applications, a wireless-based network
infrastructure can be considered as a viable alternative to a wired-based infrastructure
that is often much more expensive.
In this chapter, we answer this question by presenting results of a measurement
campaign performed on our campus testbed. Metrics of interest are loss probabilities
over individual networks and loss probability that would be experienced by an applica-
tion located on top of iPRP. The latter is obtained through an evaluation of the fraction
of packets that iPRP is not able to repair due to correlated loss over both of the paths
that are used.
In Section 7.2 we describe our experimental setup. The factors that we take into
account for this performance evaluation are presented in Section 7.3 and the measure-
ment results in Section 7.4. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.5.
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7.2 Experimental Setup
Figure 7.1 shows themapof the EPFL campuswith the roof-topmeasurement sites. The
distances between sending and receiving antennas are 180m (ELL to INN) and 230m
(CO to INN), and there is a line-of-sight. Weuse directional antennaswith the 8dBi gain,
both for transmission and reception. The testbed is based on 2.4GHz Wi-Fi-technology
(802.11b standard) and we use different channels and different polarizations for two
communication paths to minimize the mutual interference between them.
Figure 7.1: Map of the EPFL campus with the antenna locations.
Our measurement system consists of three hosts: two of them are used for trafﬁc
generation (located on the roofs of ELL and CO buildings) and one of them for trafﬁc
reception (roof of the INN building). The complete setup in the lab environment,
during the testing phase, is depicted in Figure 7.2. We use a ruggedized PC as a receiver
machine and it is equipped with two Wi-Fi cards to support the two desired wireless
channels. On the sender side we have two alix2d2 system boards1. The ruggedized
PC runs 64-bit Ubuntu OS and alix2d2 runs OpenWrt OS. The software for execution
control is done in Python, whereas the applications used for trafﬁc generation and
reception are coded in C++. In addition, we use   for trafﬁc logging.




Figure 7.2: Testbed in the lab environment during the testing phase. It consists of the
ruggedized PC (on the left) and two alix2d2 system boards. Two directional antennas
(out of four used during the experiments) are also visible.
surement units (PMUs), which is a realistic scenario in future smart grids. Concretely,
sender applications generate periodically 300-bytes UDP packets, with one packet
every 20ms. We put a packet ID and a timestamp of the moment of packet generation
in the payload. On the receiver side, we record packet-reception times and we do
this for packets transferred over both communication channels. In post-processing,
we analyze recorded log ﬁles that contain IDs transferred over two communication
channels. From this information we can match pairs of packets that belong to the same
“generation" , i.e., they mimic iPRP-replicas of the same original packet. As a result, by
analyzing the missing IDs, we can extract the information about losses on different
communication channels and about whether the observed losses are correlated (the
case when packets with same IDs sent over different channels are missing).
Time synchronization is also part of our measurement setup. To that end, we con-
nect the machines through the campus network (wired) that is used for the network
time-synchronization with precision time protocol (PTP). This way, we can also com-
pute one-way propagation times with sufﬁcient accuracy. We take the minimum of
the two propagation times to obtain the one-way delay that would be perceived by an
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application located on top of iPRP. The necessary packet sending and reception times
are already present in the log ﬁles, as described in the previous paragraph.
7.3 Factors of Interest and Resulting Measurement Scenarios
We analyze several factors as part of our experiments. Factors such as beacon period
or different channel combinations turned out to have no, or very little, effect on the
measurement results. Hence we omit these factors from the analysis that follows.
The three factors that we take into account in our analysis are time-of-day of the
scenario execution, whether MAC-layer retransmission is used or not and the raw data
rate. The time-of-day is taken into account because of the reasoning that interference
generated by other users of the non-licensed Wi-Fi spectrum is inﬂuenced by human
routine (day or night, ofﬁce hours). MAC-layer retransmissions have an effect on loss
probability. With retransmissions, even if the packet is not successfully delivered after
the ﬁrst transmission, MAC layer can repair losses in subsequent transmissions. At
the end, we analyze two different raw data-rates supported by the standard: 1Mbps
and 11Mbps. In theory, lower raw data-rates should be more robust as they use more
redundant channel-coding. Consequently, interference should be less harmful, which
should have an effect on the overall packet-loss probability.
This translates to conducting experiments in four different scenarios (combinations
of scenarios with and without MAC-layer retransmissions and with rates of 1Mbps and
11Mbps); and we keep track of the time-of-day of scenario execution.
7.4 Measurement Results
We show here the results concerning loss probabilities for the duration of experiment
of several days.
We begin the analysis by showing the results as a function of time-of-day. Figure
7.3 conﬁrms our expectation that the interference is the strongest during the working
hours, due to human activity. Consequently, the loss probability in general is the
highest in that period. We also observe that the link from ELL to INN suffers from fewer
losses, compared to the link from CO to ELL. But, more importantly, we see that the
losses that are not repaired by iPRP are very rare: loss probability is below 0.002% in all
cases.
As for the inﬂuence of data rates, in Figure 7.4 we see clearly the expected effect
(more losses for higher data rate) in the case of the link from CO to INN, whereas this
effect is not so clear for the other link. The conclusion concerning the beneﬁt o iPRP
stays the same - loss probability is in the order of 0.001% in both cases.
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Figure 7.3: Loss probabilities as a function of time-of-day.
Figure 7.4: Loss probabilities as a function of raw data rate.
In Figure 7.5, we show the results as a function of whether MAC-layer retrans-
mission is used or not. Very few losses are observed on the individual paths when
MAC-layer retransmission is used. This results in no losses from the iPRP point of view.
Even without MAC-layer retransmission, iPRP brings the loss probability down to below
107
Chapter 7. Beneﬁts of iPRP in Wireless Environment
0.002%. We decided to keep the case without retransmission in our analysis, because
such an approach can be of interest for the applications where MAC-layer retransmis-
sions are not desired. For example, very low-delay applications in environments with
many Wi-Fi users can beneﬁt from the fact that there are no retransmissions. This is
because each retransmission implies additional utilization of time slots, hence, fewer
users can be served in one cycle. Nevertheless, iPRP can repair for a good fraction of
losses that occur during the only transmission that takes place.
Figure 7.5: Loss probabilities as a function of whether MAC-layer retransmissions are
used or not.
7.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we have demonstrated the expected beneﬁt of iPRP in terms of packet
losses. From the obtained results we conclude that, if carefully designed, wireless
network infrastructure can achieve packet-delivery reliability that is comparable to
that expected from the wired infrastructure. Hence, a simple installation of the iPRP
software opens doors for cost-effective solutions, given that cabling is often the most
expensive part when building wired communication-networks from scratch.
Our future work consists of processing measurement results of the long-lasting
experiments that are currently ongoing. In addition to the loss probability analysis, we
also expect to obtain results concerning the one-way delays. The goal is to quantify
the side-beneﬁt of iPRP in reducing the latency that is perceived by an application that
runs on top of iPRP. In other words, we want to reproduce in a wireless environment
the experiments for which we show the results in Figure 5.5.
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In this thesis we study smart-grid communication networks. More speciﬁcally, the
main focus of our work is on methods that are used to satisfy, through the effective uti-
lization of redundant network-infrastructures, the reliability and timing requirements
imposed on those networks. We support our ﬁndings with simulation results, as well
as with the measurement results obtained from custom-made testbeds. The proposed
solutions are tested and evaluated, both in the lab environment and on the production
communication network of the EPFL smart-grid pilot.
We analyze the performance of different elements that are part of the EPFL-campus
smart-grid communication network that we built. We deﬁne the operating region of
the whole system and we reveal the bottlenecks that are present. We demonstrate
the importance of trafﬁc engineering for the trustworthy operation of networks that
support the delivery of critical messages.
In addition, we investigate technologies proposed in the context of smart-grid
communication networks, namely MPLS-TP. We concentrate on the security aspects of
the protocol and whether the recommendations found in numerous MPLS-TP-related
RFCs are correctly implemented in network devices offered by one of the leading
manufacturers of networking equipment. The experiments that we conduct on our
custom-made testbed reveal security vulnerabilities, even when we followed all the
recommendations from the manufacturer. We conclude that an upgrade of traditional
electrical grids can make them weaker due to security vulnerabilities, contrary to the
expected beneﬁts of smart-grid technologies. The solution can be a cohesive approach
to security that should also be unambiguous when relevant RFCs are followed.
We propose also a practical solution to the problem of effective utilization of redun-
dant network-infrastructures. We design, implement and evaluate iPRP: the IP-layer
parallel-redundancy protocol. iPRP ensures 0ms packet-repair in case of failures or
transient problems. It supports the selective replication of UDP ﬂows and does it
in a way that is transparent, both to the application and network layers. It requires
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only a simple software installation on the end-devices, with no modiﬁcations to their
operating systems. After the extensive tests performed in the lab environment, iPRP is
successfully deployed on the communication network of the EPFL-campus smart-grid
testbed. With iPRP, we bridge the identiﬁed gap of a missing method that would sup-
port the most time-critical applications that require packet communication over WAN
IP networks.
We go one step further, by comparing the algorithms that provide node-redundant
multicast-distribution-trees that could be used in parallel over a shared network in-
frastructure. Such multicast-distribution-trees are essential for the optimal operation
of iPRP. We study speciﬁcally how to adapt these algorithms in an SDN network. The
results of our simulation-based study lead to the classiﬁcation of the evaluated algo-
rithms, based on the metrics that are relevant in the context of smart-grid communica-
tion networks.
Finally, we demonstrate the beneﬁts of iPRP in a wireless environment. The mea-
surement results obtained from our roof-top testbed quantify the improvement, in
terms of packet losses perceived by an application that runs on top of iPRP. Hence,
in cases where target application are not mission-critical but where a certain level
of reliability is still desired, iPRP can be an enabler of cost-effective communication
networks that are based on wireless technologies.
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